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In this thesis I investigate the social and cultural dimensions of the self through an examination 
of the psychiatric disorder of depersonalization. Specifically, I apply Thagard's Multilevel 
Interacting Mechanisms framework to depersonalization, which reveals the complex 
interaction between the phenomenal nature of the illness, and the (culturally construed) 
conception of the self. I argue that in addition to being a factor for this particular mental illness, 
the Western independent conception of the self is descriptively incomplete. These conclusions 
have both bioethical implications for the optimal treatment of depersonalization, and 
conceptual implications as to our understanding of the self. In the former case, I advocate for 
greater recognition of the social and cultural contributions to depersonalization, and a more 
pro-active response to potentially unhealthy self-concepts. With respect to the self, I argue that 
despite the lack of a 'single monolithic self-concept', the self can be understood as unified both 
phenomenally, and more broadly by taking a multilevel approach.  
Depersonalization has been chosen for this project as it is challenging (and ultimately 
revealing) on two fronts; first it is an incredibly subtle yet disturbing phenomenal experience 
that affects approximately 2.5 percent of the Canadian population, making it an ideal subject 
for fostering an understanding of the phenomenal subtleties of selfhood.  Secondly, the rates of 
depersonalization vary dramatically across cultures, and I shall argue that this is largely a result 
of divergent conceptions of the self. An integrative multilevel account of depersonalization will 
help explain how these phenomenal and social components operate within the larger 
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My dedication is inspired by Gary Snyder's poem "For The Children," published in  his 1974 
collection Turtle Island. It is simultaneously a prescient warning of the large troubles ahead, 
and a dedication to the future generations that will have to overcome them. In order to "climb 
these coming crests" I believe a change in how we understand the nature of the self will be 
required. I therefore wish to echo Snyder's own words for future generations: 
 
stay together 
learn the flowers 
go light 
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Chapter 1: Depersonalisation and its Cultural Variation 
 
In certain forms of melancholic perversion of the sensibilities and reactive powers 
nothing touches us intimately, rouses us, or wakens natural feeling. The 
consequence is the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients, that nothing 
is believed in by them as it used to be, and that all sense of reality is fled from life. 
They are sheathed in india-rubber; nothing penetrates to the quick or draws blood, as 
it were. According to Griesinger, ‘I see, I hear!’ patients say, ‘but the objects do not 
reach me, it is as if there were a wall between me and the outer world! 
- William James, (1890, vol. 2, p. 298) 
 
Section 1.1: The Self as a “Mixture of Unity and Diversity”  
In the above passage from The Principles of Psychology, William James offered one of the first 
descriptions of what is now called depersonalization disorder. In the same work, James  also 
attempted to carve out a new theory of the self that opposed (but also integrated) aspects of 
what he perceived to be the three major conceptions of his day. These were the theory of the 
soul, the associationist model (which he ascribed to Bentham and Hume), and the Kantian 
transcendental model of the self. The theory of the soul is premised on a need to account for 
the centrality and unity of the self, which James believed he could explain without recourse to 
popular religious metaphysics. James saw Kant’s transcendental model as simply reintroducing 
these notions with greater rigor and verbosity. The associationist model was more agreeable to 
James in that it recognized much of the complexity in understanding the self, yet he believed 
that it “pour[ed] out the child with the bath” (James, 1890, vol. 1, p. 352) by neglecting to 





As [the spiritualists and transcendentalists] say the self is nothing but unity, unity 
abstract and absolute, so Hume says that it is nothing but diversity, diversity abstract 
and absolute; whereas it is that mixture of unity and diversity which we ourselves 
have found so easy to pick apart. (James, p. 352) 
 
 One hundred and twenty years later, the transcendental or spiritual conceptions of the 
self, and the associationist or reductive materialist models still exist. For example, in the 
former category there are contemporary philosophers such as Wittgenstein and van Fraassen 
(2002, 2004) who have espoused views compatible with Christian theology, while in the latter 
category we have philosophers like Daniel Dennett (1991), as well as Buddhist perspectives, 
both of which view the self as an elaborate fiction.  
And indeed, we also have many integrative models that one might characterize as being 
in the lineage of William James, in that they attempt to accept the validity of different 
dimensions of the self, without necessarily deferring to metaphysical speculation. For example, 
Dominic Murphy’s medical model as defended in Psychiatry and the Scientific Image (2007) 
as well as Paul Thagard and Joanne Wood’s Multilevel Interacting Mechanisms (MIM) model 
(forthcoming), both attempt to preserve metaphysically austere conceptions of the self without 
‘throwing the baby out with the bath water.’ 
In this paper I shall apply Thagard’s integrative framework to the psychiatric disorder 
of depersonalization, with the intent of providing insight into the phenomenal and social 
dimensions of the self. In addition to being a factor for this particular mental illness, I shall 
argue that the Western independent conception of the self is descriptively incomplete. These 




and conceptual implications as to the nature and boundaries of the self. On the subject of 
bioethical considerations, I shall advocate for greater recognition of the social and cultural 
influences that contribute to depersonalization, and a more pro-active response to potentially 
unhealthy self-concepts. With respect to our understanding of the self, this examination of 
depersonalization reveals that the whole self is an expansive entity, operating at many levels of 
description, from which we pragmatically carve different particular self-concepts depending on 
the contextual requirements of the moment. However, despite the lack of a 'single monolithic 
self-concept', the self can be understood as unified both phenomenally, and more broadly by 
taking a multilevel approach.  
Why use depersonalization for this project?  Depersonalization disorder is challenging 
(and ultimately revealing) on two fronts; first it is an incredibly subtle yet disturbing 
phenomenal experience that affects approximately 2.5 % of the Canadian population (Ross et 
al., 1990, as cited in Sierra, 2009, p. 53). As William James’ description attests, suffers often 
struggle to explain the nature of the experience through metaphorical descriptions. This is 
because depersonalization involves highly self-conscious states, making it an ideal subject for 
fostering an understanding of the phenomenal subtleties of selfhood.  Secondly, the rates of 
depersonalization vary dramatically across cultures, and I shall argue that this is largely a result 
of divergent conceptions of the self. An integrative multilevel account of depersonalization will 
help explain how these phenomenal and social components operate within the larger 




A Roadmap for the Discussion Ahead 
 The remainder of this chapter will provide a background on depersonalization, and 
discuss the evidence suggesting that variations in national rates of depersonalization correlate 
with the location of their cultures on the spectrum between individualism and collectivism.  I 
shall then tie these cultural trends to the individual level, by discussing the psychological 
distinction between !"#$%$"#$"& and !"&$'#$%$"#$"& ‘modes of being.’ The combined picture 
suggests that the Western independent conception of the self contributes to the prevalence of 
depersonalization.   
In chapter two I shall deepen the understanding of the relationship between cultural 
variation and the experience of depersonalization by providing a schema for interpreting its 
phenomenal nature. Central to this account will be the psychological process of evaluating 
objects and events on a self-vs-nonself continuum, and the related role of emotion in colouring 
our experience of the world.  
Chapter three will further integrate this phenomenal account of depersonalization with 
the social factors discussed in chapter one by implementing Thagard and Wood’s multilevel 
interacting mechanisms model of the self. Doing so will reveal the dynamic relationship 
between the social and psychological dimensions in the formation of our self-concepts, and the 
prominent role self-concepts play in depersonalization. This will lead into a discussion of the 
danger of failing to recognise the socially and culturally dependent nature of the self in the 
field of psychiatry. Specifically, I shall look at the relationship between Western mind-body 
dualism and the independent conception of the self. It has recently been found that Western 
psychiatrists intuitively employ a kind of mind-body dualism with respect to responsibility 




culturally specific conception of the self, resulting in an inability to address the social 
dimension of mental illness. While biological, neurological and psychological levels are 
typically addressed in treatment plans, the broader social and cultural level is often neglected. 
In chapter four I shall suggest some ways of actively fostering healthier social 
conceptions of the self that could potentially be recommended by a psychiatrist. This shall 
include recommendations that invoke community engagement, environmental education, 
media literacy and technological awareness. Finally, in chapter five I shall reflect on the 
implications of this discussion of depersonalization for our understanding of the self more 
generally. I shall pay particular attention to the problematic issue of drawing boundaries for the 
self, as well as the sense in which a highly independent conception of the self is descriptively 
erroneous. Collectively, this study of depersonalization reveals the conceptual and bioethical 
errors of uncritically accepting a culturally specific conception of the self. 
Section 1.2: A Brief Background of Depersonalization 
The Contemporary Understanding of Depersonalization 
Despite being the “the third most frequently reported psychiatric symptom after anxiety and 
depression” (Lambert et al, 2001, p. 250; Cattell & Cattell, 1974), depersonalization disorder 
remains a largely unknown phenomena to the public. Indeed, one Canadian study estimated its 
prevalence at 2.5 % (Ross et al., 1990, as cited in Sierra, p. 53), while a more recent German 
study found a prevalence of 1.9% (Michal et al., 2009, as cited in Sierra, p. 53). Further 
complicating matters, sufferers typically go 7 to 12 years from the original onset of the 




This paradoxically elusive yet prevalent disorder is most tersely characterized as “a 
subjective experience of unreality and detachment from the self” (Lambert et al., 2001, p. 250), 
and is effectively defined as such in the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV). It is often accompanied by derealization disorder, “the sensation that the 
external world and other people appear strange or unreal” (Lambert et al., 2001 p. 250; Hunter 
et al., 2003, p. 1451). Derealization disorder has been viewed as both a distinct disorder, and as 
a variant of depersonalization (Lambert et al., 2001, p. 250).  As the two disorders frequently 
accompany each other, others have suggested that the two disorders are in fact one, only 
characterized or described differently by the sufferer, or that they are different variations in the 
symptoms of the same general disorder. For the purposes of this work, I shall use 
‘depersonalization’ to refer broadly to both phenomena. 
Typical descriptions given by sufferers involve the suggestion that everything feels like  
“living in a dream”, or as though one is “viewing life from behind glass” (Hunter et al., 2003, 
p. 1542). However, such experiences are not merely the product of delusion; the subject is 
aware that these are the result of a subjective shift in phenomenal experience. This contributes 
to the challenge of recognizing depersonalization as a disorder, as the experience may be 
interpreted as simply a strange mental state. Studies have found that between 34 % and 70 % of 
non-clinical populations will experience at least one transient episode of depersonalisation 
(Hunter et al., 2003, p. 1542).  
Depersonalization can occur independently of any other illness (primary 
depersonalisation), or in conjunction with other illnesses such as depression, anxiety disorders, 
epilepsy, or some vestibular diseases (secondary depersonalization) (Lambert et al, 2001, p. 




depersonalization are capable of distinguishing between primary and secondary 
depersonalisation (Lambert et al. 2001, p. 252). Further, attempts to develop accurate surveys 
for discovering depersonalization have found that ‘pure depersonalisation’, where no 
associated derealization is present, is very rare (Lambert et al., 2001, p. 255). Some existing 
scales for depersonalisation include Fewtrell Depression Scale (Lambert et al., 2001, p. 250) 
the Dissociative Experience Scale (Lambert et al., p. 251), and the DSM-IV scale, called the 
Structured Clinical Interview for Dissociative Disorders. However, these scales can be both 
highly interpretative, and in the case of the DSM-IV scale, highly time consuming.  The 
(&')*&)'$#+,-!"!*.-+/"&$'0!$1+23'+4!553*!.&!0$+4!53'#$'5 takes a full three hours to complete, 
making it a logistically inconvenient tool for diagnosis (Lambert et al., 2001, p. 254). 
Issues in Phenomenal Self-Reporting 
What accounts for the average of 7 to 12 years from the original onset of 
depersonalization before the correct diagnosis is made? The principle obstacle to a correct 
diagnosis appears to be the great difficulty in communicating what the experience is actually 
like to another individual. Unlike more acute sensations like pain, the phenomenal nature of 
derealisation is like a mood that tinges the rest of one's experience. As a result, 
depersonalization has few of the salient characteristics that make pain the standard example in 
the philosophical study of phenomenal experience. Depersonalisation has no overt behavioural 
aspects akin to pain-behaviour; at best it is associated with anxiety disorders and anxious 
behaviour. Further, unlike in the case of pain, where the experience is rather self-evident, it is 
hard for even the sufferer of derealisation to pin down or communicate the phenomena. 




distressing phenomenon. Given that it is the actual change in experience that constitutes the 
‘disorder’ of depersonalization, it is not possible to be unaware of its presence for an otherwise 
mentally healthy individual.  
Additionally, derealisation does not (to the best of our present knowledge) necessarily 
correlate with any other diseases, leaving the possible mechanisms at play largely unknown.   
As a result, depersonalisation is primarily diagnosed through the patient's phenomenal 
reporting rather than any external behaviour or observable features (Modigh, 2002, p. 285). 
However, given the diffuse character of the disorder, patients often have difficulty in 
explaining exactly what they are experiencing. This lack of confidence in the verbal reporting 
contributes to the uncertainty as to whether depersonalisation and derealisation are different 
characterisations (or differently emphasised versions) of the same phenomena (Radovic & 
Radovic, 2002, p. 274). In their paper "Feelings of Unreality", Radovic and Radovic write that 
patients suffering from depersonalisation often evaluate their own descriptions as failing to 
capture the experience, and are often disappointed or frustrated by such a difficulty, further 
exacerbating associated symptoms of anxiety and depression (2003, p. 272).  
Evidence of Cultural Dependence 
In the 2009 book Depersonalisation, Mauricio Sierra summarizes the large body of 
evidence that points to a strong cultural dimension for the disorder. Indeed, his research into 
studies across the globe has found that the variation in diagnosed cases of depersonalization 
ranges from 7 % to 80 % for psychiatric in-patients (Sierra, 2009, p. 101). For example, while 
one American study of psychiatric in-patients found that 40% of their patients demonstrated at 




patients (Parikh, 1981) found the prevalence of dissociative disorder symptoms to be so rare as 
to call in to question the validity of the diagnostic category (as cited in Sierra, 101). In the 
Indian study, the 4!63"+4$%$'53".-!7.&!3"+(*.-$ was used to assess 288 Indian psychiatric in-
patients, and found that only 7.6 % presented any depersonalization symptoms. Typically, five 
symptoms must be present in order to officially diagnose a case of depersonalization using the 
Dixon scale.  
 Corroborating such disparities, in 1973 the World Health Organisation produced the 
“International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia.” It found that the prevalence of derealisation in 
schizophrenic in-patients was significantly higher in the United States and Western European 
countries, compared with the countries of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
           
Fig. 1. depersonalization in schizophrenic in-patients by nation  
 Figure 1 demonstrates the correlation; the vertical axis represents the percentage of in-




Chinese study that used a version of the Dissociative Experiences Scale found that only 1.6 % 
of psychiatric out-patients presented evidence of depersonalisation (Sierra, p. 102).  
Individualism, Collectivism and Depersonalization 
What accounts for this dramatic variation in the prevalence of depersonalization 
symptoms? Sierra postulates that the distinction in social psychology between cultures that are 
predominantly individualistic as opposed to collectivistic may be helpful in explaining the 
disparity. These concepts have been developed in the works of Harry Triandis (Triandis et al., 
1984, 1986, 2001) and by Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991), and have been 
the subject of much ongoing research (ex. Kitayama & Cohen, eds., 2007). The concepts of 
individualism and collectivism form a continuum, rather than a set of binary options. Cultures 
that are strongly individualistic emphasise a notion of the person as being highly autonomous 
and independent; “the bearer of an invariable set of attributes not affected by social context” 
(Sierra, p. 103). Cultures that endorse collectivism on the other hand, understand “the self as a 
permeable entity, in constant interdependency with the surrounding context, so that here it is 
the ‘other’ or rather, the ‘self-in-relation-to-other’ that is central to individual experience” 
(Sierra, p. 103). Recent scholarship has generally established that ‘Western’ countries (such as 
the UK, the United States and Canada) are predominately individualistic, whereas the cultures 
of Africa, Asia and much of Latin America lean strongly towards collectivism (Triandis et al., 
1984, 2001, 2002, as cited in Sierra p. 103). 
 Further studies appear to confirm or at least provide strong supporting evidence for this 
interpretation of the disparity. A 2009 German study (Michal et al., 2009) found that even 




symptoms was much higher in Western Germany than in the areas previously under the control 
of communism. The authors therefore concluded that the disparity was the result of higher 
levels of individualism in West Germany. Corroborating this interpretation, Sierra points out 
that in the 1973 WHO study, the Czech Republic, which at that time was still a communist 
state, had much lower rates of depersonalisation than its neighbouring countries (Sierra, p. 
105).  It should be noted that while the standardization of the WHO study helps reduce the 
likelihood that the variation is a result of either better diagnostic practices on behalf of Western 
physicians, or better marketing effects on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, it cannot rule 
out those explanations as co-factors. However, the evidence does seem to provide sufficient 
support for the claim that individualism plays a part in the prevalence of depersonalization. 
Section 1.3: An Explanatory Account of the Cultural Variation 
The Individualistic Conception of the Self 
The connection between individualism and depersonalization across cultures is only a 
correlative observation; it does not provide the explanatory mechanism for this 
correspondence. In the following sections I shall discuss how individualistic cultures nurture a 
conception of the self that is more prone to depersonalization. In brief, individualism fosters a 
notion of self that is highly divorced from ‘the world,’ both conceptually and emotionally. This 
separation leads to a fear of losing control, self-absorption and a lack of perceived social 
support, all of which contribute to the phenomenal experience of depersonalization.  In seeking 
to explain the nature of this separation, I shall make use of Kitayama, Uchida and Duffy’s 




shall then provide an account of the mechanisms behind the actual phenomenal shift in 
depersonalization, where the active role played by emotion will be made clear.  
Independent and Interdependent Modes of Being 
In a paper titled “Self as Cultural Mode of Being,” Kitayama, Uchida and Duffy 
develop the distinction between collectivism and individualism at the psychological and 
personal level. At this level of description, individualism correlates with an independent mode 
of being, while collectivism correlates with an interdependent mode of being (2007, p. 138). A 
mode of being is a social pattern that involves self-regulating, and self-organising features, 
which means that it influences some of the most fundamental levels of representation. In order 
to enact any mode of being, “one has to represent the surrounding environment in which action 
takes place (cognition). Within this environment, one then has to represent both the self and 
other relevant people (self-other representation)” (p. 138). To summarize, one’s mode of being 
forms the foundation for evaluating the world on a self-vs-other continuum, thereby creating 
the space for a notion of selfhood. 
 As mentioned previously, the independent mode of being is much more prevalent in 
Western countries such as the United States, Canada and the UK. According to the authors, the 
principle feature of the independent mode of being is an emphasis on self-directedness. Such 
self-directedness leads to: 
• An influence-oriented style of action  
• Self-centricity in self-other representations 
• Analytic cognition 
(Kitayama, Uchida, Duffy, p. 139). 
 A  passage by Clifford Geertz is often quoted for its concise summation of this mode of 




individual  is “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, 
a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive 
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background” (Geertz, 1975, p. 45; Gibbs, 2006, p. 18; Kitayama, Uchida, Duffy, 2007, p. 144). 
The notion of the self as a distinctive wholeness possessing clear boundaries with the social 
and natural environment will be of particular relevance for understanding the nature of 
depersonalization. 
 Conversely, the interdependent social pattern primarily emphasizes social 
responsiveness. The three principle features that result are: 
• An adjustment-oriented style of action 
• Other-centricity in self-other representation 
• Holistic cognition 
(Kitayama, Uchida, Duffy, p. 139).  
 The interdependent social pattern is more characteristic of Asian cultures such as Japan, 
China and India, which have dramatically lower rates of depersonalization. How exactly do 
these social patterns contribute to the actual experience of depersonalization? For the 
remainder of this chapter I will offer some contributing psychological factors for 
depersonalization that are encouraged by individualism and the independent mode of being. In 
chapter three this account will be deepened by looking into the phenomenal mechanisms 
behind depersonalization.  
Losing Control, Self-Absorption, and Social Support 
A meta-study (Sierra-Siegert & David, 2007) points to a few important psychological 
traits that contribute to the higher rate of depersonalisation in individualistic cultures. It looked 




symptoms across Western and Non-Western countries.” The meta-study found that the ‘fear of 
losing control’ was highly correlated with both individualism and depersonalization. These 
“findings were interpreted as suggesting that ‘feelings of lack of control’ might be a relevant 
experience mediating the effects of individualism on depersonalization” (Sierra, 2009, p. 106). 
In addition to the fear of losing control, other specific psychological traits have been 
found to correlate with individualism.  Several studies have shown that ‘self-absorption’ is 
more frequently found in predominantly individualistic cultures (Smith, 1990; Roberts and 
Helson, 1997; Twenge and Zhang, 2004, as cited in Sierra, p. 108). Self-absorption results in 
“a more externalized locus of control, which makes [the individual] more sensitive to threat, to 
feelings of alienation and of not being in control” (Sierra, p. 108).  This appears to contrast 
with a feeling of implicit social support commonly held by those from highly collectivistic 
societies. This sense of implicit social support has been shown to have a protective effect on 
those under threatening or stressful circumstances. Compared to a control group, those with an 
implicit sense of social support experience “attenuated psychological and biological responses 
(blood pressure, heart rate, cortisol levels) to experimental stressful conditions (Taylor et al, 
2007; Shen et al., 2004)” (Sierra, 108). 
 Sierra points to a 2001 study to support the claim that the experience of ‘implicit social 
support’ results in reduced stress and depersonalization experiences (Aderibigbe et al., 2001).  
This epidemiological study looked at the correlation between church attendance and the 
prevalence of depersonalization symptoms. The results show that higher church attendance 
correlated with reduced depersonalization symptoms, regardless of the strength of religious 
belief held by those in the study, suggesting that “the social aspects of church attendance may 




 The psychological traits of self-absorption, a fear of losing control, and a lack of 
‘implicit social support’ help to explain why the independent mode of being correlates with 
higher rates of depersonalization. In the next chapter this account can be deepened by looking 
into the phenomenal components of depersonalization. A greater understanding of the 
associated phenomenology will also help elucidate the active and interwoven role of the social 




Chapter 2: Understanding the Phenomenal Dimension 
Section 2.1: A Phenomenal Model of Self-Consciousness 
To obtain a better grasp of the mechanisms behind the social and cultural aspect of 
depersonalization, one must not only understand how this domain interfaces with the 
psychological domain, but also how cultural variation gives rise to alterations in phenomenal 
experience. As discussed in section 1.2, depersonalization, as an experience, can be very 
difficult to describe. In order to help communicate their experience, sufferers of 
depersonalisation often resort to metaphorical or abstract language. “Sufferers describe their 
experiences of unreality as if they are living in a dream, and their sense of detachment from the 
world as though they are viewing life from behind glass” (Hunter et al., 2003, p. 1452). 
Furthermore, it is the phenomenological experience itself that constitutes the ‘disorder’ of 
depersonalization. To therefore help explain the experience of depersonalization and its 
relation to cultural level phenomena, one should account for the associated phenomenology. In 
this chapter I shall introduce (and adapt) a framework of self-consciousness developed by Tilo 
Kircher and Anthony David, that helps elucidate the phenomenal mechanisms at play in 
depersonalization. This framework reveals how social and cultural variation in emotional 
responsiveness and self-relevance ascriptions to external objects, can account for the subtle 
phenomenal shift encountered in depersonalization. 
Kircher & David’s model of Phenomenal Self-Consciousness 
 In “Self-Consciousness: An Integrative Approach from philosophy, psychopathology 




develop a conceptual framework for discussing self-consciousness that is informed by recent 
neuroscience, phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy. While Kircher and David 
apply this model to depression, I shall employ its most useful features to help explain the 
phenomenology of depersonalization. The primary phenomenal concepts introduced by 
Kircher and David are transparency, presence, ipseity, self-qualia, introspective self-
consciousness, and the self versus non-self continuum. It should be noted that despite their 
attempt to be highly multi-disciplinary, some of Kircher and David’s terminological selections 
can be rather awkward in light of the related philosophical and cognitive science literature. As 
a result, while their concepts are of great utility, some of their selected names for these 
concepts will be ignored or improved upon. 
Transparency and Presence 
 Borrowing from Metzinger (1995), Kircher and David argue that phenomenal 
consciousness is characterized by three central properties: transparency, presence, and 
perspectiveness. Transparency (which is perhaps better named illusory transparency) refers to 
the inability to consciously perceive the actual mechanisms behind our own cognitive activity. 
While our brain constructs our experience of reality, “the mechanism of this construction is not 
represented in it. The representational character of phenomenal consciousness is not accessible 
to consciousness” (Kircher & David, 2003, p. 447). That is, the phenomenal nature of 
experience presents itself to us as direct and self-revealing, when it is only demonstrating a 
particular scaffolding of reality.  
The concept of presence is much simpler; it refers to the focus of attention in our 




of what is presently brought to conscious attention. For example, the immediate presence of 
sensation A (say a painful pin prick) may make one unaware of sensation B (for example, a 
moderate level of hunger). 
The ‘I’, Self-Phenomena and Foundational Ambience 
A third component of phenomenal consciousness is the presence of what Kircher and 
David simply call the ‘I’ (p. 448), which I interpret as a perspectival orientation that provides a 
predominantly unified phenomenal experience. Kircher and David refer to this unified 
phenomena as ‘perspectiveness,’ and suggest that there are two components: Self-Qualia and 
Ipseity (p. 448). As used by Kircher and David, ‘self-qualia’ involve different aspects of self-
consciousness, such as self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity and self-history (p. 449), all 
understood as experiences, rather than psychological components. For example, there is a 
phenomenal notion of self-coherence, and a more objective psychological notion. In the 
phenomenal case, we are referring to the actual experience of feeling like a coherent being, 
whereas a psychological use of the term might refer to the set of psychological mechanisms 
that collectively result in coherence. While there is a strong connection between these 
concepts, phenomenal coherence does not necessarily entail psychological coherence. For 
example, various psychological self-coherence mechanisms could become corrupted in 
schizophrenia, resulting in a disturbance of phenomenal self-coherence. In other cases 
however, they may be inversely correlated. For example, an individual might exhibit numerous 
persistent examples of incompatible beliefs that would normally cause cognitive dissonance, 
without any attempt to bring these divergent thoughts into a state of coherence. Nevertheless, 




therefore use the phrase ‘conscious self-phenomena’ for this body of concepts, as this will help 
facilitate the integration with Thagard’s MIM model in chapter three, as well as avoid the 
unnecessary distractions associated with the literature on qualia.    
Ipseity is an even subtler concept, perhaps made more mysterious by the strange choice 
in terminology. It refers to the underlying foundation for self-consciousness, which largely 
arises from unconscious background cognition. As used by Kircher and David, ipseity is the 
“unifying basic tone of the first-person givenness of all experiences” (p. 447). A broader 
explanation provides a clearer picture; ipseity denotes the aspect of phenomenal experience 
that forms the underlying mood or atmosphere, colouring the rest of one’s experience. In 
addition to providing the atmosphere behind experiences, ipseity also ties them together; “it is 
this feeling of ipseity that makes our experiences feel a united, single being” (p. 449). Instead 
of using the term ‘ipseity’, I shall use the much clearer phrase foundational ambience. This 
foundational ambience differs from the aforementioned self-coherence in that it deals with the 
coherence of the apparent and experienced world, rather than the coherence of one’s thoughts 
or beliefs. The role of foundational ambience will become even clearer once we consider the 
example of depersonalization. However, before we do so, we much introduce the concepts of 
introspective consciousness and the self-vs-nonself continuum. 
Second Level Self-Consciousness and the Self-vs-Nonself Continuum 
So far, Kircher and David believe themselves to have only discussed the first level of 
self-consciousness, which they distinguish from a second level of introspective self-
consciousness (p. 449). Introspective self-consciousness is the “reflective awareness” of our 




as a perception-like, higher-order representation of our own mental states” (p. 449).  For 
example, we are capable of reflecting back on our own thoughts to consider the character of a 
pain sensation, or more subtly, the character of our sense of self-confidence or self-coherence. 
Occasionally (or famously, in Hume’s case), when we reflect upon these phenomena, their 
previously self-evident character can become uncertain or ill-supported, either due to their lack 
of mechanistic transparency, or because the act of self-reflecting fundamentally changes the 
phenomena in question. 
For our purposes, one of the most important aspects of introspective self-consciousness 
is the notion of self-valence; the evaluation of things on a self versus nonself continuum. 
Because the term ‘self-valence’ conjures up the traditional concept of emotional valence as it is 
used in psychology, I shall use the term ‘self-relevance’ in its place. Kircher and David argue 
that all of our conscious experiences, from memories and feelings to perceptions, are evaluated 
on this self-vs-noneself continuum: 
 
For example, autobiographical content of being in love has a high self-valence, 
whereas the insignificant event of a bee landing on a flower (observed by you) has a 
low self-valence. This means that the content of phenomenal consciousness and 
introspective consciousness is processed on a self versus nonself continuum. (p. 
450) 
 
The concept of self-valence concerns the degree to which objects and events are 
experienced as having a close relationship to the self, rather than simply being an actual 
component of the self. Objects like one’s own cerebral cortex, and events like one’s birth 




interstellar dust on the outskirts of the solar system could be an example of something that 
would typically rate as on the extreme low (nonself) side of the continuum. 
A high value (one closer to the self) on the self-vs-nonself continuum does not 
necessarily correlate with a positive emotional response, nor does a low value on the self-vs-
nonself continuum necessarily correlate with a negative emotional response. A high rating on 
the self-vs-nonself continuum only means that the designated object is perceived as being 
highly interconnected with the self; this could be emotionally positive or negative. For 
example, a toxic tailing pond from the Alberta oil sands may score highly on the self-vs-
nonself continuum for a local resident, but this does not mean that it will invoke a positive 
emotional response; obviously it elicits quite the opposite. However, another individual may 
witness the same tailing pond but perceive it as having very little to do with themselves, and 
therefore have little (or no) emotional response. A third individual may experience a moderate 
rating on the self-vs-nonself continuum while witnessing the tailing pond, but a very positive 
emotional response, as it is part of a project that generates economic prosperity (perhaps 
directly for his or her family), and helps distribute an important resource.  
As this example shows, an event that scores highly on the self-relevance scale can have 
either a positive or negative emotional response. However, some kind of emotional response is 
more likely with higher self-relevance ratings. The reason for this is rather simple; things 
which are more interrelated with the self are more likely to play an active role in one’s safety 
or harm, while objects or events that score extremely low on the self-relevance scale are likely 
to be irrelevant to one’s well-being. Of course, sometimes we are completely ignorant of 




When we do become newly aware of an object’s self-relevance, our emotional response to it 
changes accordingly. 
The terminological choice of ‘self-relevance’ also helps clarify the nature of the 
phenomena at issue, as it is not a question of directly identifying the self with events like the 
bee landing on a flower, but rather a question of whether one perceives an event as strongly (or 
weakly) interconnected with the self. However, there is also clearly some overlap self-
relevance and self-identity; as shall be explored more specifically in chapter five, the self is a 
relational entity, and our understanding of ourselves is partly constituted by our particular 
interpretation of these relationships.  
Application to the Phenomenology of Depersonalization 
 This set of phenomenological conceptual tools can help provide some clarity in 
understanding the experience of depersonalization. In their discussion of these concepts in 
relation to depression, David and Kircher make an offhand suggestion that depersonalization 
and other similar disorders may ‘overthrow’ the normal ‘self-construct’ (p. 449). The normal 
‘self-construct’ refers to our usual experience of our own self-coherence, self-agency and other 
conscious self-phenomena that can be altered or disturbed. This disturbance is made 
additionally puzzling to us because we believe we experience our selves directly (or 
transparently), in the style of a naive direct realism. The transparency therefore falsely 
suggests that the normal mode of the self-construct reflects a stable self, as though it were a 
concrete entity. But as depersonalization demonstrates, even the self involves a great deal of 
contextual construction that can be altered or corrupted by various disorders, like Capgras 




 This suggestion by Kircher and David provides an initial sketch of the possible 
mechanisms behind the phenomenology of depersonalization, but a consideration of the other 
phenomenal concepts provides a fuller picture. As a disorder, depersonalization is experienced 
as an introspective self-consciousness phenomenon, where one’s own underlying conscious 
state is the object of one’s conscious attention. This focus on one’s own consciousness appears 
to be the result of an alteration, or shift in the overall character of one’s experience, which 
suggests that depersonalization is the result of a change in the foundational ambience. As 
operations in the realm of the foundational ambience provide the “unifying basic tone of the 
first-person” of experiences (p. 447), this would explain why depersonalization is not a specific 
acute sensation (like a piercing noise or a bitter taste), but rather, an overall atmosphere, 
colouring all of experience. Perhaps this alteration makes the foundational ambience more 
noticeable (present), or alternatively, it becomes more noticeable simply because it has 
undergone an alteration. Either way, in depersonalization one’s reflective self-consciousness 
becomes focused on the altered foundational ambience. 
 Additionally, the process seems to create a positive feedback loop, where increased 
introspective self-consciousness contributes to depersonalization, and depersonalization in turn 
increases reflective self-consciousness (evidence for which shall be provided at the 
psychological level in the next section, and more broadly in chapter three). In terms of 
conscious self-phenomena, this inward focus that involves both self-absorption and self-





Second-Order Thought, Attention, and Stress 
 Two pieces of evidence that support the claim that introspective self-consciousness is 
involved in the phenomenology and manifestation of depersonalization include the success of 
particular cognitive therapies, and a strong relationship to anxiety. Substantial success in 
reducing depersonalization symptoms has been found in treatment strategies that emphasize the 
‘reduction of self-focussed attention’ (Hunter et al., 2003, p. 1461). This typically involves a 
cognitive exercise called refocusing: 
 
Refocusing through the use of specific, predetermined, words, objects, images, or 
self-statements can help the person increase their contact with reality, orientate them 
to their immediate environment, and break the cycle of increasing self-focussed 
attention on their symptoms. (Hunter et al., 2003, p. 1461) 
 
The success of this treatment strategy points to the possibility that the act of inwardly focusing 
one’s conscious attention contributes to the manifestation of depersonalization. In the act of 
refocusing, it is as though the mind unwinds the inwardly focused attention back out toward 
the world, thereby alleviating the symptoms.  
 It has been mentioned that anxiety often accompanies depersonalization (Lambert et al, 
2001, p. 250), and recent research has demonstrated a strong correlation.  For example, 
Michael and colleagues (2005b, as cited in Sierra, 2009) found a very strong relationship 
between social anxiety and depersonalization disorder, while an earlier study of adolescents 
found that those with a disposition towards increased self-consciousness had an increased 
likelihood of developing depersonalization (Roth, 1998, as cited in Seirra, 2009). Increased 




on by the experience of stress, a topic discussed by Thagard and Wood (forthcoming). They 
point out that many tasks that are performed automatically and with great ease can become 
hampered under high stress circumstances such as job interviews. Under these circumstances, 
people can “become much more aware of their own mental states and location in a social 
interaction. This awareness has an identifiable psychological side, as people become alert to 
their own personal behaviour and the way in which they are mentally representing what is 
happening in their environments, as well as their own beliefs and emotional feelings” (Thagard 
& Wood, 30-31). It is this kind of second-order awareness of previously automatic processes 
that constitutes the disorder of depersonalization, although it differs from the regular 
experience of stress, in that one’s foundational ambience seems to have permanently changed.  
Section 2.2: Emotion and Self-Relevance 
The Origin of the Phenomenal Shift 
This account, combining Kircher and David’s framework with recent research, has helped to 
elucidate the phenomenal shift that occurs in depersonalization. However, the original source 
of the alteration in consciousness has yet to be explained. For the remainder of this chapter, I 
shall explore the possibility that emotion plays a role in initiating this phenomenal shift. A shift 
in one’s emotional processing can originate from many domains; at cultural and psychological 
levels there are pressures to have appropriate emotional responses to particular stimuli, while at 
biological or neurological levels there are disorders that can disrupt normal emotional 
processing, such as prosopagnosia (the inability to recognize faces) or Capgras delusion (where 
friends and family  are suspected to be imposters). After reviewing the relation between 




clearly and strongly connected to our cultural environment through our designation of things in 
the world on a self-vs-nonself continuum (self-relevance). 
Emotional Numbing and Visual Hypoemotionality 
Emotional numbing is highly correlated with depersonalization, with some studies 
finding it present to some extent in 100 % of patients (Sierra, p. 142). Recent research in 
neuropsychology and the cognitive sciences has found evidence that disturbances in one’s 
emotional capacity are comparable with the phenomenal characteristics typical of 
depersonalization. As disorders like Capgras delusion and episodes of amnesia demonstrate, 
one’s emotional functioning is deeply connected to the recognition of others and one’s sense of 
self. In his review of the recent literature, Sierra writes that “a reduction in the affect attached 
to an autobiographical memory can cause it to be experienced as if one had been a detached 
external observer at the time, rather than a direct participant ” (Sierra, p. 142). Similarly, if 
your experience or perception of your own body does not illicit the accustomed emotional 
response, it can lead to disorders where your own body is interpreted as ‘unreal’ or not 
belonging to yourself. Examples of this include forms of alien hand syndrome, and mirrored 
self-misidentification. 
 There is also neurological evidence that emotion should be considered a ‘core 
experiential component of perception,’ as opposed to a passive addition to your otherwise 
emotionally sterile visual experience. As Halgren and Marinkovic write,  “in addition to a 
pathway of information processing leading to semantic recognition, there is a parallel pathway 
in charge of assigning emotional significance to percepts ” (Halgren and Marinkovic, 1994, as 




hypothesized that these are responsible for phenomenal experiences such as ‘atmosphere,’ 
‘immediacy’, and ‘vividness’ (Gloor, 1990, as cited in Sierra, p. 143). Further, there is 
evidence that this emotional processing is a pre-conscious event, which explains why 
perception is already ‘emotionally coloured’ when it arises in consciousness (Sierra, p. 143). 
 While depersonalization patients may experience a lack of emotional response to 
certain stimuli, they do not suffer from a global emotional processing malfunction, which 
suggests that in depersonalization the disruption occurs specifically in “the process which 
allows emotion to gain conscious representation” (Sierra, p. 144). Sierra suggests that ‘visual 
hypoemotionality’ can be used as a framework neurological model for depersonalization 
(hypoemotionality simply refers to disorders that reduce, either partially or completely, one’s 
emotional responsiveness). Visual hypoemotionality occurs in cases of prosopagnosia, where 
the failure for proper emotional processing leads to the inability to properly register and 
recognize familiar faces. Patients diagnosed with the disorder suffer from the aforementioned 
lack of vividness and ‘emotional colouring.’ One patient offered the following description of 
the change in experience: 
 
I loved flowers so much before...Their charm doesn’t enter my mind any more. 
Looking at the landscape through the window, I see the hills, the trees, the colours, 
but all those things cannot convey their beauty to me... Everything looks ordinary, 
indefinite. I feel indifferent about it. What I lack is feeling. (Habib, 1986, p.578, as 
cited in Sierra, p. 148) 
 
 In a report by Lopera and Ardila (1992) a highly-educated 58 year old male is 




and resultant prosopagnosia and visual hypoemotionality. This man offers another lucid and 
enlightening description of the change in experience: 
 
Interviewer:  “What is it for you to look at flowers, or a landscape?” 
Patient:  “Flowers to me have lost their essence, I fail to see them as part of nature. They 
have become almost synthetic, artificial, I seem to lack a kind of knowledge, no 
its not really a knowledge, rather a certain clarity to see nature itself. I fail to see 
the flower in all its authenticity.”  
Interviewer:  “What about landscapes?” 
Patient: “Just as with flowers, there is also an emptiness to landscapes. I cannot 
appreciates them,  I cannot grasp the beauty of nature. I lack a kind of lucidity; a 
lucidity in my vision that would normally allow me to appreciate it; its colours, 
the temperature of its colours so to speak. I cannot think of a right word to 
explain it. I just cannot enjoy that sense of beauty that nature brings.”  
Interviewer:  “Can you tell beautiful from ugly things?” 
Patient: “Not in my current state. There is a lack of feeling to what I see. I recently went 
for holidays to the mountains in California, and whilst I was there, I realized 
that the snow failed to evoke in me that particular, indefinable feeling of 
‘snowness.’ It rather seemed as something made out of plastic. It did not bring 
up any feelings even as I walked on it.”  
(as quoted in Sierra, 149) 
The suggestion that emotional processing is an innate, subconscious component of 
perception is consistent with Kircher and David’s account of self-consciousness. The 
‘fundamental ambience’ appears to be altered in the event of hypoemotionality, leading to the 
sudden strangeness of perception, and the increased sterility or ‘otherness’ of the apparent 
world. Changes in emotional processing are very likely playing a similar role in the 




Emotion as a phenomenal modifier also provides a possible explanation for the 
differences between derealization and depersonalization. Perhaps in cases of derealization, 
one’s emotional response to the world is numbed, resulting in the interpretation that it is 
somehow unreal. In cases of depersonalization on the other hand, one’s emotional response to 
one’s own internal sense of self, one’s own self-history, has become numbed, leading to an 
interpretation that one’s own self is not fully real, or is being viewed ‘through a glass darkly’. 
Alternatively, it could be that the differentiation of depersonalization and derealisation 
is a result of divergent understandings as to the boundary between the self and the world. In 
each case the sufferer could be having a reduced emotional response to ‘the world’, with those 
who hold a more permeable notion of the self and world experiencing this effect also applying 
over themselves. To take an example from the history of philosophy, Wittgenstein didn’t 
identify the self with the physical body or anything in the external observable world. In the 
Tractatus he famously said that if he were to write a book entitled “The World as I Found It,” 
in addition to describing the physical environment, it would also have to depict his physical 
body, and the aspects of it that are under his control. However, the self, or subject would 
remain isolated by this account, not a component of the describable world (5.631). Perhaps a 
more common view is that the self extends out to the boundaries of the body and skin, a 
practical conception for medical concerns. Further still, philosophers like Andy Clark have 
argued that the mind and its faculties extend all the way out into the world (Clark, 2008), 
presumably taking the self along for the ride.  
Each of these cases involve internal representations of the self, or ‘self-concepts,’ a 
subject I shall discuss in greater detail in section 3.1. For now, the important point is that one’s 




world, may affect the phenomenal character of depersonalization. If one has a disposition 
toward thinking of one’s own body as being more a part of the world than part of the self, then 
perhaps it is more likely to be subject to reduced emotional response in depersonalization, 
whereas those who rate the body closer to the self on the self-relevance scale do not as easily 
experience alienation and hypoemotionality towards it. 
Emotionality, Self-Relevance and Flowers 
The similarity to hypoemotionality suggests that an alteration in emotional processing 
and the designation of the boundary between the self and the world collectively play an 
essential role in the phenomenology of depersonalization. It seems easy to underestimate the 
pervasive role that emotion plays in cognition. Recall David and Kircher’s example of 
witnessing a bee land on a flower (p. 450). They used this ‘insignificant’ event as an example 
of something that has a very low self-relevance (that is, an event that is perceived as being well 
into the non-self side on the self-vs-nonself continuum). While it is likely true that such an 
event would rank low for the average North American, he or she will none-the-less experience 
some kind of emotional colouring while witnessing the act. If this were not the case, the event 
may appear ‘plastic’ or without the regular ‘fullness’ that perception provides.  
Other cultures however, may experience this event as having higher self-relevance, 
thereby altering (or perhaps enhancing) the emotional colouring, while decreasing the sense of 
independence from the environment. In particular, collectivistic cultures with a worldview that 
contains a form of animism, or a belief in the personal ‘meaning’ of events in the world (for 
example astrology, superstitions and omens), may rank such events highly on the self-vs-




which views everything in nature as imbued with its own spirit, and many of the pre-Colonial 
Indigenous religions of North America before they became more monotheistic under the 
influence of Christian missionaries (Cave, 2006). Alternatively (or concurrently), a culture may 
simply encourage an acute awareness that an act of pollination is necessary for their food crops 
and entire way of life.  
The implications of this cultural variation in self-relevance evaluations are significant 
for depersonalization. From a perspective where the self and world are more interwoven, the 
natural environment may act like a social support community, similar to that of a human 
community. Recall the study by Aderibigbe and colleagues (2001); it was shown that a sense 
of ‘implicit community support’ correlated with a decrease in the experience of 
depersonalization symptoms. A sense of implicit community support implies a degree of 
emotional connection and recognized interdependence with others in the community. It is 
possible that some indigenous communities, by possessing a greater degree of emotional 
responsiveness to the natural environment, experience it as another community of support, 





Chapter 3: Multilevelism and Mind-Body Dualism  
Section 3.1:  An Integrative Account of Depersonalization 
I now wish to integrate these phenomenal, psychological and social components into a broader 
account of depersonalization that reflects the multilevel nature of the illness and the self. For 
this, I will employ the framework of Paul Thagard's Multilevel Interacting Mechanisms (MIM) 
approach, which has been previously been applied to both mental illness (Thagard and Findlay, 
forthcoming), and the self (Thagard and Wood, forthcoming).The MIM model acknowledges 
four particularly relevant levels for understanding both the self and mental illness: the 
molecular, biological, psychological and social. Using the MIM model will help situate the role 
of social and cultural contributions to the formation of the self, while also accounting for and 
giving proper credit to the phenomenal and psychological aspects of the disorder. By gaining a 
broader vantage point of the mechanisms behind depersonalization, one can more clearly see 
the dynamic interaction that occurs between these levels, often resulting in feedback loops that 
reinforce depersonalization. Additionally, the MIM model incorporates the environment at 
every level, providing an expansive account that can accommodate a diversity of cultural 
conceptions of the self. Finally,  the MIM model is fruitful for our purposes, as it recognizes 
that the social level and the psychological level can play an active causal role in the 
manifestation of mental illness, or in particular, that the Western conception of the self 
contributes to the occurrence of depersonalization.  
In section 3.2 I shall argue that psychiatry may be unwittingly endorsing an 




dualism. This failure to recognize the social and cultural level the self (and by extension, 
mental illness) has two implications. First,  the MIM model suggests that mental illness is best 
treated when it is addressed at all levels: molecular, biological, psychological and social. If 
psychiatry fails to recognize the social level of mental illness, it will also fail to suitably 
address this level. Secondly and more broadly, there is a danger that psychiatry may be 
employing a Western culturally specific notion of selfhood in its approach to mental illness 
globally. In chapter four I will discuss some options for pro-actively addressing this level of 
mental illness. 
Thagard & Wood’s Multilevel Interacting Mechanism Model of the Self 
 Thagard and Wood’s multilevel system theory of the self is laid out in their 
forthcoming publication “Who are You?” This model is an alternative to both transcendental 
views of the self (which involve metaphysical entities such as souls that escape scientific 
investigation) and deflationary views that resolutely deny the reality of an existing self (p. 3), 
reminiscent of William James’ alternative to the transcendental and associationist models of 
the day. 
 Another resemblance is found in the recognition of the multiple dimensions of the self, 
without losing their overall unity. James discussed three selves; the material self, the social self 
and the spiritual self (by which he meant the introspective capacity of consciousness) (James, 
1890, vol.1, p. 329). Similarly, under a MIM model of the self, there are systems operating at a 
variety of different levels, with each system consisting of an environment, parts, 
interconnections and changes (EPIC). As mentioned, the MIM model proposes four principle 




of the major characteristics of the MIM model of the self is that each level interacts causally 
with every other level, giving appropriate credence to each dimension (whereas transcendental 
views privilege the psychological and perhaps cultural to the exclusion of the others, while 
deflationary views do the reverse).  
To provide one clear example of the appreciation for multiple level interaction, 
consider the ‘downward causality’ from the psychological to the molecular seen in the 
phenomena of epigenetics: it has been found that in some mental illnesses, such as major 
depressive disorder, one’s psychological state can affect gene expression (Thagard & Findlay, 
forthcoming, p. 24-26).  However, Thagard and Wood unambiguously assert that we should 
not take this to mean that there are four separate selves; rather, it is the unification of these 
levels that compose the self. The self is simultaneously a multiplicity encompassing a variety 
of ‘self-phenomena,’ and a unified collective whole (I shall return to the issue of unification in 
chapter five). Thagard and Wood refer to this general approach as 8)-&!-$0$-!58 (p. 3). 
 I should note that I am not endorsing an ontological reading as to the relevance of these 
four particular levels, that is, I am not suggesting that the molecular, biological, psychological 
and social planes all exist with equal objective ontological status. Rather, these levels are 
selected for understanding the self and depersonalization on epistemologically pragmatic 
grounds. I understand this pragmatism to be shaped both by the kinds of explanations desired, 
as well as the cognitive capacities and intuitive modes in which we scientifically investigate 
the world. Cognitive capacity is relevant in terms of how complex a system we wish to use in 
understanding a phenomena. For example, while there is likely a molecular representation of 
introspective self-conscious phenomena, it would be massively complex for us to ‘see’ and 




psychological level. For mental illness and the self, the four levels of  the MIM approach 
appear to be comprehensive for understanding the relevant mechanisms involved, their 
interactions at different scales, and their combined effect. Of course, this also complicates the 
nature of the ‘causality’ between levels, a topic too large to deal with at present. For the 
immediate purposes, this causality will also be understood pragmatically, given our orientation 
as epistemic agents. As such, I am taking a largely descriptive approach to MIM.  
Reviewing the Four Levels of Depersonalization 
In the paper “Conceptual Change in Medicine: Explanations of Mental Illness from 
Demons to Epigenetics” (forthcoming), Thagard and Findlay apply the MIM model of analysis 
to mental illness, showing that mental disorders are best understood as operating at the same 
four principle levels: the social, psychological, neural and molecular. Although we have 
focused on the social and psychological levels of depersonalization, it is clear that it also 
operates at neurological and molecular levels. I shall now briefly review the principle 
components of depersonalization as these levels.  
The molecular and neural levels are the least understood in the overall mechanism of 
depersonalization, and I shall address them together, although much of the known information 
is weighted towards the neural domain. At these levels, the environment includes the 
neurochemistry and neurological composition present in the human body. The parts include 
chemicals (such as norepinephrine), neurons, and the entities they compose in the brain. The 
interactions and changes involve alterations in the presence of the relevant hormones and 
neurotransmitters, as well as variations in the degree of neural activity in different areas of the 




Seirra points out that studies have shown norepinephrine and cortisol levels to be both raised 
and reduced in patients with depersonalization, compared to a control group (p. 135, 140).   
However, some neuroimaging studies have been more successful in identifying relevant 
neurological aspects of depersonalization. One study using positron emission tomography 
(PET) scans found anomalous activation patterns compared to a control group (Simeon et al., 
2000, as cited in Sierra, p. 136). Specifically, patients showed increased activity in areas of the 
parietal and occipital lobes, and decreased activity in the right superior and middle temporal 
gyri, regions considered responsible for association. Other functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies have pointed to reduced activity in the areas of the amygdala and the 
insula (both of which are related to emotional processing), as well as “attenuated autonomic 
response to arousing emotional stimuli” (Sierra, p. 139). Again, there was also evidence of 
increased activity in the prefrontal cortex regions that are associated with emotional control 
(Sierra, 139). Finally, a degree of treatment success with serotonin-selective reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), as well as opioid antagonists suggest that serotonergic mechanisms and the opiod 
system are involved in the manifestation of depersonalization (Sierra, p. 113-120). 
I have been primarily concerned with the psychological and social levels of 
depersonalization. The psychological environment is incredibly broad, and includes 
phenomenological experience, as well, as well as the various psychological mechanisms and 
capacities. The parts are slightly harder to carve at the psychological level, although we can 
point to some psychological processes, as well as mental representations such as beliefs, 
intentions and desires, and in particular self-concepts.. We have already discussed a number of 
associated factors of depersonalization that operate at the psychological level. Some of the 




• the independent mode of being 
• self-absorption and self-centricity 
• stress and anxiety 
• a reduced emotional responsiveness (hypoemotionality) 
• reflective second-order consciousness 
 
At the social level, the environment includes “all the objects that people causally 
interact with, including natural objects such as rocks and lightning bolts, artefacts such as 
houses and cars, and social organizations such as teams and governments” (p. 6). The social 
level is incredibly broad; it includes everything from individual to individual level interaction, 
all the way to up to larger features of social organisation, both overt (for example, political 
government structure) and subtle (as seen in cultural assumptions). The multitude of relations 
between people (who are also the parts), from mere glances on the bus to love affairs and 
political allegiances, constitute the interconnections. Lastly, the changes include the entirety of 
the constant dynamic interaction occurring between peoples, both acute (as in a conversation 
between two individuals) and defused (as in the overall impact made by new technological 
methods of communicating, like cell-phones, Twitter etc). 
At the social level, a number of factors have also been discussed. These have included: 
• an individualistic culture 
• a community that provides ‘implicit social support’ 
• a large disparity between self and world on the self-vs-nonself continuum 
• socially contextual self-concepts 
 
Dynamic Interaction between Psychological and Social Levels 
Although the factors contributing to depersonalization can be broken down into these 
distinct levels, the mechanisms operating at each are highly interwoven, often creating positive 




is still in its infancy, little can be said presently about the interaction between this level and the 
psychological and social levels. Seirra does hypothesize that the concomitant anxiety and 
hypoemotionality associated with depersonalization could be responsible for the conflicting 
results about cortisol and norephinephrine levels. In the case of cortisol, anxiety would be 
raising levels while hypoemotionality simultaneously reduces it (Sierra, p. 135, 140). This 
would be an example of two competing factors of ‘downward causality’, from the 
psychological level to the molecular and neurological. However, Sierra concludes that not 
enough research has been performed to say anything with a great deal of certainty (Sierra, p. 
140).  
As we know far more about the psychological and social domains, most of the 
presently observable feedback systems occur in their dynamic interaction. Both levels possess 
a variety of interwoven and reinforcing factors for depersonalization. If one tries to tell a kind 
of causal story stringing these factors together, one will find that it alternates between the 
social and psychological domains. For example, an individualistic culture nurtures an 
independent mode of being. An independent mode of being contributes to a clear delineation of 
the self and world on the self-vs-nonself continuum. This contributes to self-absorption and 
self-centricity, which correlate with particular independent self-concepts that will contribute to 
hypoemotionality, anxiety and a lack of perceived implicit social support.  
Let’s break this down a bit. Recall that the Sierra meta-study showed a high correlation 
in Western countries between the “fear of losing control” and depersonalization symptoms. 
Culturally, Western countries are predominantly individualistic, and an individualistic self-






At the level of the individual (as opposed to cultures) self-experience has also been 
shown to be influenced by both ‘individualistic’ and ‘collectivistic’ self-
representations. It has been experimentally found that, as compared with people 
whose ‘collective self’ is threatened, those whose ‘individual self’ is threatened 
typically experience the threat as being more severe, experience a more negative 
mood and report more anger. (Gaertner et al, 1999, as cited in Sierra, p. 108) 
 
It is hypothesized that a fear of losing control is partly responsible for increased anxiety and 
stress in Western society, which also correlates with a greater chance of experiencing 
depersonalization (Michael et al., 2005b). The ‘fear of losing control’ may be amplified by two 
cultural phenomena. The first is an overall value placed on self-dependence, which requires a 
belief in a significant degree of self-control over the environment. A related consideration is an 
excessively delineated conception of the self, which is at odds with the great physical 
interdependence of the self and the world, and the great deal of chance and circumstance 
involved in this relationship. For example, Western culture encourages early financial 
independence in youth, and encourages planning for complete financial independence during 
one’s senior years, whereas parts of Europe still encourage youth to remain home with the 
family until marriage, and expect to care for seniors in the later years. Circumstances beyond 
one’s control (such as illnesses or financial recessions), can make it difficult or impossible to 
be entirely self-sufficient, creating a degree of dissonance between cultural expectations and 
one’s viable options. 
In addition to fostering an impossible sense of control (and the associated anxiety that 
increases the disposition for depersonalization), this set of self-relevance evaluations, and the 




depersonalization, through the aforementioned reduction affectivity, changing one’s 
foundational ambience.  
Self-Phenomena, Self-Concepts and Social Influences 
 We therefore have a story that is constantly alternating between the social and 
psychological domains, with multiple reinforcing factors at play.  A central component of this 
account of depersonalization is the phenomena of self-representation. Thagard and Wood 
(forthcoming) offer a taxonomy of self-phenomena, from which the self-representing family is 
of greatest relevance to depersonalization, and in particular, the representation of oneself to 
oneself. This discussion of depersonalization has made it apparent that how one represents 
oneself to oneself is highly dependent on the social and cultural environment. 
Additionally, recent psychological research has shown that we possess a variety of self-
representations, or self-concepts (which include one’s beliefs, thoughts and self-knowledge) 
(Thagard & Wood, p. 23; Gibbs, 2006, p. 20).  At any given time, a particular self-concept may 
be emphasized, due to the associated context and norms. Markus and Kunda (1986) call the 
self-concept that is presently used in consciousness the working self-concept (as cited in 
Thagard & Wood, p. 24). Different dimensions of our lives contribute to differently framed 
self-concepts; for example, our working self-concept likely varies while in religious, political 
and work environments. Raymond Gibbs writes that even at the bodily level, there is a huge 
variety of self-concepts; “the complexity of our bodily experiences promotes an equally 
complex set of self-identities” (Gibbs, 2006, p. 20)  Gibbs goes on to say that individuals “talk 




concepts that arise from their varied bodily experiences in the physical and social world” 
(Gibbs, p. 20).  
Similarly, there are also social self-concepts that correlate with the social environment. 
Thagard and Wood summarize some of the supporting psychological evidence for the social 
dependence of the working self-concept. For example, consider the psychological mechanism 
of priming; if one were to ask a subject about themselves after having watched a political 
documentary, the subject may be more likely to provide a politically tinged self-description.  A 
similar phenomena called social comparison demonstrates that individuals offer self-
descriptions that are relative to the norms of their immediate social circumstances (Wood, 
1989, as cited in Thagard & Wood, p. 24). For example, a 30 year old individual is more likely 
to employ a working self-concept involving youth while visiting a retirement home, and a self-
concept related to maturity while visiting a local high school.  
 In addition to physical and acute social circumstances, there is a third realm of even 
broader cultural influences that may be ever-present, and therefore constantly shaping one’s 
working self-concepts. The consideration of the cultural domain brings us all the way back to 
the distinction between individualism and collectivism, the broadest level of influence 
associated with depersonalization we have examined. Cultures located on different ends of this 
spectrum nurture different modes of being at the individual level. And one’s cultural mode of 
being is going to influence the whole spectrum of self-concepts one is likely to employ, as they 
provide different norms for interpretation the nature of the self and its relationship and 
boundaries with the world. As discussion, this variation in self-relevance evaluations 




environment. Furthermore,  reduced emotional responsiveness to ‘the world’ has been shown 
to correlate with an increased likelihood of depersonalization.  
The placement of a culture on the spectrum between individualism and collectivism 
depends on an innumerable set of influences, some overt, others historical and subtle. Within 
Western culture, one historically and conceptually important notion for the self is found in the 
lineage of mind-body dualism. In section 3.2 I shall discuss the connection between mind-body 
dualism and the independent conception of the self, as well as its lingering influence in 
psychiatry. I will then conclude this chapter by discussing the dangers of not recognising the 
broad cultural influence on our conception of the self for the field of mental health. 
Section 3.2: Psychiatry, Mind-Body Dualism and the Self 
Western Mind-Body Dualism and Judgements of Responsibility 
I have two purposes in discussing mind-body dualism with respect to depersonalization. The 
first point I wish to make is that the western lineage of mind-body dualism contributes to the 
dominance of the independent conception of the self, by providing a metaphysical and 
conceptual framework for drawing a clean line between the self and the world. Secondly, I 
want to raise the concern that mind-body dualism continues to influence psychiatry, shaping 
how judgements of responsibility are made. The combined conclusion is that Western 
psychiatry may be importing a culturally specific conception of the self in its approach to 
mental health, thereby failing to address all levels of contributing factors for mental illness.  
The Western cultural and conceptual legacy of mind-body dualism can have an 
influence both as an overt metaphysical belief, and as an underlying metaphysical assumption. 




mind and body can be traced back at least as far as Plato, with dualism permeating Greek 
culture and philosophy quite broadly. Within the field of medicine specifically, Greek 
physician Galen was already distinguishing between ‘natural’ involuntary processes and 
voluntary actions by the second century (Brownell, 2009, p. 32), an early delineation of 
responsibility with respect to the mind and body.  
The supporting role that Western dualism plays in maintaining an independent mode of 
being is apparent upon reflection. By providing the conceptual framework for making a clear 
divide between the internal mental self and the external world, individuals are granted a 
significant degree of internal independence from other sentient beings, and the insentient 
world. Furthermore, this metaphysical dualism lays the groundwork for our interpretation of 
depersonalization, as a disconnection of the self from the world. To be clear, this conceptual 
distinction is not a required feature for the general phenomena of depersonalization, but it will 
shape how the phenomenal experience of the disorder is interpreted. And, given that the 
disruptive aspect of depersonalization is the phenomenal shift, one’s interpretation of the 
experience is of particular importance. 
Of course, there are also distinctions between the mind and body in Eastern cultures, 
but these two aspects are typically understood to be in a more interconnected relationship. For 
example, Brownell writes that “in classical Chinese medicine, there is a 'mind-body synthesis' 
in contrast to the 'mind-body dualism' of the West. Qi constitutes a 'third term' mediating 
between the psychological and the physiological, or mind (xin) and the body (xing/shen), 
which cannot be understood from the standpoint of Western mind-body dualism" (Brownell, 





[The Cartesian view] of the mind-body distinction is very different from Buddhism, 
if we take the example of the Japanese tradition, where mind and body are seen to be 
mutually dependent. Mind and body in Zen Buddhism should be brought into 
harmony; while in secular Cartesianism they must be divided and separated. In 
Japanese Buddhism, the body is a field of energy or power (ki). In acupuncture, 
martial arts and dance, the aim is to increase awareness and control of this force, 
enhancing its flow through the body (Yuasa 1993). This practical awareness is 
acquired through experience rather than through intellectual contemplation. These 
techniques of performance which are central to this practical experience are found in 
the tea ceremony, archery and theatre, and hence we can argue that these embodied 
practices shape the particular habitus of Buddhist practices. (Turner and Yangwen, 
2009, p. 9-10) 
 
The picture is a bit more diverse for Indian conceptions of the mind and body, which 
range from non-dual schools of thought like Avaita Vedenta, to various forms of dualism or 
three-part distinctions (Chakrabarti,1999). Of course, a comprehensive review of the 
differences and similarities is beyond the scope of this project; our present concern is the 
relationship between Western mind-body dualism, depersonalization and contemporary 
psychiatry. The suggestion that Cartesian dualism has uniquely contributed to psychiatric 
disorder is not new, and has been explored in recent feminist literature. In Unbearable Weight, 
Susan Bordo has argued that the underlying Cartesian dualism of Western culture is a 
contributing factor for disorders such as bulimia and anorexia nervosa, and describes 
“psychopathology as the crystallization of culture” (Bordo, 1993, p. 139). Similar approaches 
are found in the work of Foucault (1961) and Deleuze & Guattari (1972, 1980); however, these 





 Furthermore, Bordo’s account looks primarily to the general population’s sense of 
mind-body dualism; an additional concern is that this delineation also persists in our 
professional approach to mental health. Although Western mental health professionals may 
consciously maintain a scientific, materialist disposition, they can still deploy unconscious 
dualistic assumptions when faced with issues of choice, responsibility and other notions related 
to the self. Cultural psychiatrist Laurence Kirmayer has examined the prevalence of dualistic 
thinking in contemporary Western psychiatry, and its roots in both our culture and our intuitive 
conceptual reasoning. In a study with Marc Miresco (2006), they write that the mind-brain 
dichotomy “reflects a basic cognitive schema that is used intuitively to understand human 
behaviour and, in particular, to make sense of troubling events” (p. 913).  
According to Kirmayer and Miresco, judgements of responsibility play a central role in 
determining whether something is perceived to be the result of the mental realm or the physical 
realm. Judgements of responsibility concern whether someone was in control of an undesirable 
event (and therefore blameworthy and deserving of scorn) or subject to uncontrollable 
circumstances (and therefore deserving of compassion and sympathy) (p. 913). The issue of 
responsibility raises an import link between what one perceives as falling under the category of 
selfhood, and therefore self-control, and the kind of emotional response that is therefore 
appropriate to certain circumstances. As discussed earlier in section 3.1, a fear of losing control 
was found to correlate highly with experiences of depersonalization. Excessively individuated 
conceptions of control may lead one to believe that he or she should have control over (and 
therefore be responsible for) actions or objects that are under the influence of a variety of other 
additional influences. The problem of control therefore points to one of the relationships 




emotional responses that one is therefore predisposed to experience. I will now discuss the 
evidence for the persistence of responsibility-based dualism in psychiatry. 
The Persistence of Mind-Body Dualism in Psychiatry 
 In a fascinating study by Miresco and Kirmayer, it was shown that despite efforts to the 
contrary, mental health professionals continue to (covertly) operate using dualistic assumptions 
about the mind and body in addressing their patients (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006, p. 913). 
Their study involved a self-report questionnaire sent to 270 psychiatrists and psychologists at 
the Department of Psychiatry at McGill University, of whom approximately 50 percent 
responded. The questionnaire involved clinical vignettes, from which the participants were 
asked to rate the degree of “intentionality, controllability, responsibility, and blame attributable 
to the patients” (p. 913). Additionally, the participants were asked to evaluate the role of 
“neurobiological, psychological, and social factors in explaining the patients’ symptoms” (p. 
913). Each vignette described a man in his 30s, and consisted of both a condition and a 
problematic behaviour. The three conditions were 1) serotonin related manic episodes, 2) 
narcissistic personality disorder, and 3) heroin dependence. The three behaviours were 1) 
spending all of his money and going bankrupt, 2) knowingly engaging in high-risk sexual 
behaviour and contracting HIV, and 3) stabbing his wife (p. 914).  
 Miresco and Kirmayer found that “mental health professionals tend to use a mind-brain 
dichotomy in their reasoning about clinical vignettes and suggest that this dualistic thinking 
reflects, at least in part, the implicit judgments of responsibility that they make regarding 
patients’ symptoms” (p. 916). Specifically, they found that clinicians tended to associate 




“they tended to view behaviours with a biological etiology as unintentional, uncontrollable, not 
within the patient’s sphere of personal responsibility, and less blame-worthy” (p. 916). This is 
not to suggest that all notions of responsibility are a priori invalid or metaphysically dubious; 
rather this finding is a warning against the assumption that medicine (and psychiatry 
specifically) has moved beyond dualism, and perhaps a motion to more critically consider what 
forms of dualistic reasoning with respect to responsibility are appropriate in psychiatry. 
Miresco and Kirmayer suggest that it would be fruitful for mental health professionals to 
“acknowledge its continuing influence on their thinking and to consider carefully the potential 
implications of this kind of reasoning” (p. 918).  
Terminological Provincialism, Culture and Psychiatry 
 How does this mind-body dualism continue to influence psychiatry? In addition to the 
general cultural background from which the profession has evolved, there are acute ways that 
culturally specific concepts can continue to enter psychiatry. One such way is through the 
phenomenon of terminological provincialism, which is touched upon in Dominic Murphy’s 
2006 book Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. He explains that “few psychiatric terms are in 
fact technical coinings with no outside use. They tend to be taken from the wider culture (like 
‘self-esteem,’ which many people think is a crossover from therapy but was in fact coined by 
Milton) or drawn from other sciences” (Murphy, 2006, p. 332).  The result is that concepts are 
introduced into psychiatry carrying their cultural connotations. 
With respect to depersonalization, the concern is that psychiatry may be employing a 
culturally specific conception of the self that may obscure possible causes and dimensions of 




self, we will also be missing cultural dimensions of mental illness. Kirmayer has researched the 
cultural variation in the manifestation of mental illnesses such as depression (2001). On this 
subject, Kirmayer wrote: 
 The clinical presentation of depression and anxiety is a function not only of 
patients’ ethnocultural backgrounds, but of the structure of the health care system 
they find themselves in and the diagnostic categories and concepts they encounter in 
mass media and in dialogue with family, friends and clinicians. (Kirmayer, 2001, p. 
22) 
 
Through his study of cultural variation, Kirmayer became acutely aware of the danger of 
applying the same diagnostic disease treatments uniformly across cultures. He writes that in 
our globalized world, conceptions of illnesses are “in constant transaction and transformation 
across boundaries of race, culture, class and nation. In this context, it is important to recognize 
that psychiatry itself is part of an international subculture that imposes certain categories on the 
world that may not fit equally well everywhere and that never completely captures the illness 
experience and concerns of patients” (Watters quoting Kirmayer, p. 197). 
Of course psychiatry, as a project with the normative goal of helping those suffering 
from mental illness, will always be value-laden. As Rachel Cooper writes in Psychiatry and the 
Philosophy of Science, “at the level of practice, psychiatry is clearly affected by value 
judgements at every turn. Perceptions of neediness and worthiness affect who is diagnosed, 
and whether and how they are treated” (Cooper, 2007, p. 127). While we cannot make 
psychiatry a project free of normative values, we can reduce the degree to which it enforces a 
kind of cultural hegemony by applying a singular treatment model universally. A simple 
recommendation is therefore to actively acknowledge culturally assumed concepts and 




particular mental illness. With respect to depersonalization, we have seen that one’s culturally 
shaped conception of the self can greatly increase the likelihood of experiencing 
depersonalization. However, if psychiatry is uncritically importing Western language and 
thought pertaining to the notion of the self, it may not recognize this aspect as a variable in 
mental illness. 
If the social realm is found to play an active role, as it does in depersonalization, the 
second step is to address this level; recall that a major implication of the MIM model of mental 
illness is that disorders are best treated when the contributing factors at each level are 
addressed. In the treatment of depersonalization, patients are often prescribed SSRIs or other 
pharmaceuticals that address the neural and molecular levels, in combination with treatments 
like cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) that focus on the psychological level, and to some 
extent the social level, by addressing immediate levels of interpersonal interaction. But the 
broader cultural or social level appears to be largely unrecognized and therefore neglected. In 
addition to being simply unrecognized, this neglect may be due to the relative difficulty of 
altering one’s cultural environment or cultural self-concepts, but it is not an a priori 
impossibility. 
If a patient is suffering from depersonalization in part due to an independent self-
concept, what can be done to foster greater interdependence? In chapter four the viability and 
options for pro-actively altering the social and cultural dimension of the self will be explored. 
In the final chapter I shall then reflect on the implications for our broader understanding of the 
self, revealing that in addition to contributing depersonalization, an independent self-concept is 




Chapter 4: Altering the Cultural Self-Concept  
Section 4.1: Intentional Modification of the Social Self  
Perhaps the first move in considering how our cultural self-concepts might be made more 
interdependent is to look at existing alternatives. Following a brief review of some cultures that 
exemplify interdependence, I shall discuss the limits to self-concept voluntarism. I shall then 
discuss two examples where socially influential self-concepts have been consciously altered; 
an advertising ban on plastic surgery in response to rising unhealthy body images, and a 
comprehensive pharmaceutical strategy to change an entire nation’s conception of mental 
illness. In section 4.2, the insights gathered from these cases will be used to form some 
recommendations for fostering greater interdependence in Western self-concepts. Lastly, in 
chapter five I shall conclude by reviewing the implications for our understanding of the self, its 
boundaries, and relationship to the world. 
Pre-Existing Alternative Conceptions of the Self 
There are numerous cultures that incorporate more interdependent conceptions of the 
self, but for brevity I shall simply discuss some trends in North American Indigenous cultures, 
and Zen Buddhism. Indigenous philosopher Anne Waters (2004) has examined the different 
‘ways of being in the world’ between historical first peoples and contemporary North 
Americans, and she writes that this disparity is predominantly “cashed out in notions about 
personal and social identity” (Waters, 2004, p. 106). Specifically, Waters contrasts the non-
binary ontology common to Indigenous cultures with the more binary contemporary 




rigid boundaries that do not interact or ‘cross over’ to other constructs" (p. 99), whereas non-
binary ontologies embrace more continuous notions of objects. One real life application of 
these ontologies can be seen by looking to gender; while North American conceptions have 
been predominantly binary, Waters writes that "many indigenous gender categories are 
ontologically without fixed boundary" (p. 107). This non-binary ontology is the result of a 
more relational, rather than object-oriented approach to identity. In Research Is Ceremony, 
Shawn Wilson supports this interpretation. Having studied the contemporary Indigenous 
peoples of North America and Australia, he found that their ontologies and epistemologies 
consisted of relationships between things, rather than of things-in-themselves (Wilson, 2008, p. 
73). This shift in the conceptualization of identity results in highly interdependent self-
concepts. 
 A similar relational emphasis is seen in Japanese Buddhism. In his exegesis of the 
Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra, Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh offers a concise description of this 
perspective. He writes:  
 
If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of 
paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; 
and without trees, we cannot make paper. The cloud is essential for the paper to 
exist. If the cloud is not here, the sheet of paper cannot be here either. So we can say 
that the cloud and the paper inter-are. (1988, p. 3) 
 
This passage describes an explicit interdependent mode of being, and understanding of 
identity.  Together, these descriptions of Japanese Buddhism and Indigenous ontologies 





However, a psychiatrist should not simply tell a depersonalized patient with a highly 
independent self-concept to merely adopt an Indigenous or Japanese alternative. This would 
not only violate norms of cultural and religious sensitivity, but also be entirely unnecessary. It 
is not the overt beliefs, but the underlying interdependent mode of being that is desirable, and 
this may be possible to integrate with presently held explicit beliefs. 
 The alternative ontologies (and their respective conceptions of the self) do not require 
embracing a form of animism or an inherently superstitious worldview. None of the above 
descriptions involved explicit metaphysical commitments or dogmas; rather, they described a 
difference of attitude. In the philosophical literature, they are more reminiscent of a stance (in 
the sense used by van Fraassen), or a Carnapian linguistic framework. For the sake of brevity, 
let us focus on the notion of a stance. In his précis for The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen 
provides perhaps his most concise definition, writing that a “stance consists of a cluster of 
attitudes, including propositional attitudes (which may include some factual beliefs) as well as 
others, and especially certain intentions, commitments and values” (Précis, 2002). Put slightly 
differently, a stance is a foundational orientation towards the world, or an original 
interpretative scaffolding, formed through our inherited values and conceptual distinctions. 
Rowbottom & Bueno (forthcoming) have argued that adopting a critical attitude towards one’s 
own stance helps challenge potentially unwarranted assumptions and maximize one’s 
rationality. However, the adoption of an alternative stance is not a purely voluntary matter, as 
some stances preclude the shift into an alternative (p. 7).  
For example, considered as a stance, the foundation underlying a ‘young earth 




explanations for contradictory evidence with virtually no constraints, given that God has the 
unlimited power to ‘make it so’. If radiocarbon dating techniques suggest that the dinosaurs 
roamed the Earth over 200 million years ago, the creationist may respond that God only made 
it appear as such to test our faith.  Similar inflexibility is seen in conspiratorial reasoning, 
where any contradictory evidence may be rationalized as part of a larger more nefarious cover-
up. These extreme examples demonstrate how some stances are too dogmatic to be easily 
adjusted. 
 The psychological capacity to reject disagreeable evidence was confirmed in a recent 
study on political self-identification. Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler (2010) presented 
political news articles with misleading claims, some of which included a factual correction, to 
a group of subjects. They found that when a subject was presented with a factual correction 
that was incongruent with the subject’s political self-identification, the subject had a tendency 
to ignore the evidence. It was even found that in some cases, there was a "backfire effect" 
where the presented evidence actually reinforced the factually incorrect beliefs. This example 
of political self-identification demonstrates the power that some of our self-concepts possess 
over our interpretation of the world, especially when they are deeply entrenched. In fact, as the 
sample population for the Nyhan and Reifler study consisted of university undergraduates, it 
was suspected that the number of 'backfire' cases was less than would be found in the general 
population, as undergraduates often have "relatively weak self-definition” (Nyhan & Reifler, 




Ethical Considerations for Broad Cultural Change 
 A related problem is that the desire to change one’s own conception of the self will be 
limited if the surrounding cultural environment remains the same, as self-concepts are the 
product of a variety of cultural influences that in some cases (such as mind-body dualism) have 
a lineage spanning centuries. There are therefore two scopes to the active change of cultural 
self-concepts; change for an individual within a culture, and change for the culture itself. 
Action at the individual level is akin to a treatment plan that is suggested by a doctor to their 
patient, whereas action at the second level is analogous to enacting national health policies or 
educational programs. Of course, the increased prevalence of depersonalization alone is 
insufficient justification to pursue the alteration of an entire culture’s dominant self-concept. 
Such a foundational shift would have rippling effects on many additional cultural and 
psychological domains, with potentially undesirable effects. Furthermore, highly 
interdependent self-concepts likely promote their own set of mental illnesses.  
A third and more foundational ethical concern is that we do not wish to encourage 
homogenous cultural self-concepts. The issue of ‘cultural hegemony’ has been a historical 
problem for minority self-concepts. For example, Ann Waters has written that with the loss of 
Indigenous languages, the associated notions of identity are vanishing: “[it] is a loss of 
conceptual ontology; it is a loss of a way of being in the world; it is a loss of ways of relating 
in the world; and in its concrete manifestation it is a loss of personal, social, cultural identity, 
or self” (2004, p. 106). Furthermore, without coexisting alternative self-concepts, it is much 
more difficult to identify how a particular self-concept may be related to or contributing to the 
prevalence of a mental illness. Just as genetic diversity is ideal for responding to changing 




facing the evolving needs of our cultural and physical environment. If every individual across 
the globe had a highly independent self-concept, we may never have realized that the social 
domain was connected to the manifestation of depersonalization. 
My recommendations for the intentional modification of self-concepts should therefore 
be limited to individuals specifically suffering from depersonalization who also have a highly 
independent mode of being (although it is likely that other disorders may benefit from their 
own particular treatment with respect to self-concepts). However, even at the individual level, 
there is the issue of rippling effects on other psychological and cultural faculties. A process 
akin to the standardized trials for new medical or psychological treatments should therefore be 
implemented. If a new self-concept was successfully fostered in a patient, they could be 
monitored for possible cultural and psychological contraindications, as well as any benefits 
from the transition, hopefully building up a body of data supporting the efficacy of the self-
concept change in reducing depersonalization. 
 However, we still have yet to show how more interdependent self-concepts could be 
nurtured in light of the discussed limitations to stance voluntarism. I shall begin by reviewing 
some successful examples that involve political legislation and pharmaceutical advertising. In 
section 4.2 some (ethically acceptable) recommendations for fostering greater interdependent 
self-concepts at the individual level shall be generated from these examples.  
a. Advertising as Intentional Cultural Manipulation 
 In this first example, we see the active role that advertising and its regulation can have 
on cultural self-concepts. As is clear by now, our culture and our self-concepts are mutually 




cited in Heine, 2007) demonstrated this acutely by looking at the interaction between 
advertising and cultural norms. Their hypothesis was that the “kind of messages that would be 
most persuasive would reflect ideas widely shared within a culture” (Heine, 2007, p. 728). 
They examined a variety of magazines from both the United States and Korea, noting the 
degree with which the ads reinforced themes of conformity or uniqueness. They found that 
themes of uniqueness were common in American magazines, while themes of conformity were 
common in Korean magazines, confirming their hypothesis. “This suggests that the kinds of 
cultural messages that people encounter on a day-to-day basis are helping to reinforce the 
different views of self in the two cultures” (Heine, 2007, p. 728). 
However, it is still possible to pro-actively break these cycles by exerting some control 
over the advertising environment. For example, Spain recently moved to ban advertisements 
that promote ‘the cult of the body.’ Specifically, the ban states that “broadcasters cannot carry 
advertisements for things that encourage the cult of the body and have a negative impact on 
self-image – such as slimming products, surgical procedures and beauty treatments – which are 
based on ideas of social rejection as a result of one's physical image or that success is 
dependent on factors such as weight or looks” (Tremlett, 2010). The new law bans television 
advertisements for plastic surgery and other beauty treatments before 10pm, and was motivated 
by a concern that these forms of advertising were contributing to eating disorders and other 
mental illnesses in youth. Although this is a small move, it is nevertheless an attempt to shape 




b. Pharmaceutical Manipulation of Social Concepts 
A much more dramatic and impressive example of intentional cultural manipulation can 
be found in the marketing of depression to Japan during the last decade. In an investigation of 
the Japanese attitude toward depression, Ethan Watters interviewed Dr. Laurence Kirmayer, 
co-author of the previously mentioned study on the prevalence of mind-brain dualism in 
psychiatry and director of the Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry at McGill 
University. In the interview, Kirmayer describes an encounter he had with the pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline at a conference they had sponsored, ostensibly concerning cultural 
attitudes towards depression. Upon arriving at the event, Kirmayer realized that 
GlaxoSmithKline had a very specific goal in mind; it wished to change the cultural attitudes 
towards depression in Japan, making the population more friendly (and susceptible) to the idea 
of using antidepressants. GlaxoSmithKline had invited the best and brightest in cultural 
psychology to act as an elite brainstorming group to help accomplish this goal (Watters, 2010, 
p. 192). 
As Watters explains;  
[GlaxoSmithKline’s objective] was to influence, at the most fundamental level, the 
Japanese understanding of sadness and depression. In short, they were learning how 
to market a disease. To have the best chance of shifting the Japanese public’s 
perception about the meaning of depression, GlaxoSmithKline needed a deep and 
sophisticated understanding of how those beliefs had taken shape. This was why, 
Kirmayer came to realize, the company had invited him and his colleagues and 
treated them like royalty. (Watters, p. 193) 
  
 Traditionally, Japanese culture had viewed depression exclusively as a serious illness 




United States (Schulz, 2004). There was no concept of a ‘mild depression’ that required more 
moderate medical attention. Instead of being seen as a sign of mental illness, Japanese culture 
had “often idealized and prized states of melancholy” which were thought to be character 
building and “a source of moral meaning and self-understanding” (p. 211). Additionally, 
Tanaka-Matsumi and Maresella (1976) have suggested that Japanese citizens possess a less 
‘individuated self-structure’ that contributes to an understanding of depression as an 
environmental rather than a mental phenomena. They performed a study that looked at the 
differing conceptions of depression in three demographics: Japanese nationals, Japanese 
Americans, and Caucasian Americans. Individuals in each group were asked to provide word 
associations for depression or yuutsu, the most equivalent term in Japanese. Here are top ten 
words for each group: 
 
 
Japanese-Nationals: Japanese-Americans: Caucasian-Americans: 
1.  rain, rainy 1.  sad, sadness 1.  sad, sadness 
2.  dark, black 2.   lonely, loneliness 2.   lonely, loneliness 
3.  worries 3.  down 3.  down 
4.  grey 4.   frustration 4.   unhappy 
5.  cloudy, rain cloud 5.  low 5.  moody, moodiness 
6.  suicide 6.  failure 6.  low 
7.  solitude 7.  blue(s) 7.  blue(s) 
8.  exams 8.  tired 8.  gloom, gloomy 
9.  depressing 9.  unhappy 9.  failure 
10.  disease 10. die, dying, death 10. upset 




Tanaka-Matsumi found that while the American words described internal emotional states, the 
Japanese terms primarily consisted of external environmental descriptions. They concluded 
that this was not just a linguistic phenomena, but reflective of divergent conceptions of the self, 
with the Japanese nationals demonstrating a greater degree of interdependence (or a less 
‘individuated self-structure’) (Tanaka-Matsumi & Marsella, 1976, p. 389-392). 
To overcome these conceptions of depression and the self, advertising campaigns and 
promotional material by GlaxoSmithKline introduced and propagated the phrase kokoro no 
kaze, which translates to “a cold of the soul.” The implication was that one’s inner life can 
from time to time become sick, but not in a way deserving of social stigma. Additionally, like a 
common cold, this ‘cold of the soul’ could be effectively treated with the proper medication 
(Watters, 2010, p. 225). However, this message alone did not help to convey any urgency, so it 
was combined with additional campaigns that sought to raise alarmist concerns about the risk 
of suicide (Watters, p. 228). GlaxoSmithKline also specifically targeted prominent mental 
health professionals, knowing that their opinions would have an sway many others, and took 
advantage of its influence as a primary funder of a pharmaceutical research on the subject of 
depression. The company wielded tremendous power over what kinds of studies were funded 
in the field of pharmacological treatment for depression, effectively allowing it to block or 
discourage evidence contrary to its ends (Watters, p. 237). The combined strategy was a 
tremendous success, and antidepressants are now commonly prescribed in Japan. Speaking 
about the overall implications of this campaign, Kirmayer wrote that the “changes have far-
reaching effects, informing the cultural conceptions of personhood and how people conduct 




While this story acts a successful example of intentionally manipulating the cultural 
concepts that shape the self, it also an unfortunate case, as the push for a purely pharmaceutical 
approach to depression neglected both the psychological and social aspects of the illness. In 
particular, it is believed that unrealistic working demands and a variety of associated social 
stresses rose dramatically during the 1990s and 2000s, largely as a result Japanese asset bubble 
collapse (Watters, p. 229). It is quite ironic that cultural manipulation was used to diminish the 
recognition of cultural and environmental factors in depression. It should also be noted that 
there is some debate as to whether the increase in rates of depression in Japan were the result 
of better diagnostic strategies, better marketing by pharmaceuticals, an actual change in the 
understanding of the self, or some combination of the these. However, for our purposes the 
exact scenario is not important; what is clear is that GlaxoSmithKline did change popular self-
concepts, even if this wasn’t the primary reason for the spike in depression diagnoses.  
Section 4.2: Suggestions for Fostering a More Interdependent Self-Concept 
The use of an advertising ban and the marketing of depression in Japan are recent examples of 
intentional manipulation of the cultural environment in ways that affect both self-concepts and 
mental illness. However, the GlaxoSmithKline strategy demonstrated ethically problematic 
tactics, including deceptive portrayals of the success of antidepressants, emotional 
manipulation through alarmism over suicide rates, and disguised advertisements that were 
often in the form of call-outs for experimental participants in drug trials (which was a way of 
circumventing Japan’s ban on direct-to-consumer marketing) (Watters, 2010, p. 225-229).  
Additionally, GlaxoSmithKline manipulated the publications on the pharmaceutical 




and forwarding ‘ghost written’ articles supportive of its own drug treatments (p. 225-229). 
Such behaviour not only violates basic research ethics, but also potentially puts the health of 
millions at risk (Sismondo & Doucet, 2010). With respect to depersonalization, a psychiatrist 
should not mislead a patient for the sake of fostering greater interdependent self-concepts, nor 
should they use coercive or covert means. If we were to take these examples of self-concept 
manipulation and use them in good faith to help move an individual’s self-concept towards a 
more permeable, interdependent model, what broad recommendations for psychiatry could be 
made? Secondly, in an acute case where a psychiatrist recognises strong cultural influences in a 
patient’s depersonalization, what recommendations can be made to treat this level of the 
disorder? 
In terms of a broad strategy, a first step is to encourage professional recognition of the 
social dimension in the relevant fields of mental health, and  to some extent this is already 
happening (for example, see the 2010 volume The Impact of the Environment on Psychiatric 
Disorder, edited by Freeman & Stansfeld). Additionally, the construction of a list of effective 
recommendations that can be offered to individuals to develop a more interdependent self-
concept would help simplify what is otherwise a daunting level of treatment. I shall now offer 
four possible recommendations. 
Acute Recommendations for fostering an Interdependent Self-Concept 
Potentially every aspect of one’s culture contributes to what self-concepts become 
dominant, from business endeavours to artistic acts and religious practices. The support of 
more interdependent approaches in any of these fields will therefore also help nurture a more 




actively work to alter their social self-concepts; political or community engagement, the natural 
environmental, the mass media, and technology.  
 The political environment is an obvious starting point, given that some of the original 
evidence for cultural variation in depersonalization also tracked different political systems 
(recall that East Germany and the Czech Republic under communist rule both had lower rates 
of depersonalization than the surrounding more democratic states). However, the political 
domain is one of the least acceptable areas for a psychiatrist to make recommendations, nor do 
I wish to encourage anyone to become a soviet-era communist! However, the active support 
and engagement in political theories that recognize the social component of the self may help 
to create an environment that reinforces interdependence over independence. For example, 
while some political theories like anarcho-capitalism are premised on an independent 
conception of the self, communitarianism construes self-determination as dependent upon “the 
social preconditions under which that capacity can be meaningfully exercised” (Kymlicka, 
2002, p. 212). Kymlicka characterizes the independent conception of the self as the ‘Kantian’ 
view, where the self is understood to be “prior to its socially given roles and relationships,” 
allowing it to rationally judge them accordingly (p. 221). In opposition, “communitarians 
believe that is a false view of the self, [as it] ignores the fact that the self is ‘embedded’ or 
‘situated’ in existing social practices, which we cannot always stand back and opt out of ” (p. 
221).  
If a patient already has an political interest that has communitarian-styled values, this 
would be an ideal avenue for hoping to generate greater interdependent self-concepts. Of 
course, psychiatrists cannot make explicit political recommendations to their patients, but it is 




help develop an ‘implicit sense of social support’. Recall that the study by Alderbridge et al., 
(2001) found that church participation decreased the likelihood of experiencing 
depersonalization, regardless of the strength of an individuals particular beliefs. The next three 
proposals are similarly neutral and more universally recommendable to patients suffering from 
depersonalization. 
While the first recommendation involved greater involvement with social groups, my 
second proposal concerns the natural environment. It is possible that becoming more 
acquainted with the natural environment that one’s well-being is dependent upon will help 
develop a more interdependent self-concepts. This could include hands-on experience (in the 
form of farming or hiking for example), as well as direct education to better understand the 
variety of interdependent relationships between the self and the natural world. Doing so may 
help foster new self-concepts, as well as potentially cultivate an ‘implicit sense of social 
support’ with the natural environment. To some extent, there is a precedent for therapeutic 
considerations that involve both the natural and ‘artificial’ environment. For example, the 
interdisciplinary field of environmental psychology, and the psychotherapeutic school of 
ecopsychology have both attempted to understand and address the relationship between 
psychological well-being and the environment. 
A third possibility is to encourage media-literacy as it pertains to one’s self-
representation.  For depersonalization, the goal would be to help a patient recognize forms of 
consumer advertising and consumer-cultural generally, that foster excessively independent 
self-concepts. This style of treatment has previously been effective in preventing the 
development of eating disorders in adolescents (Levine & Smolak, 2007). Specifically, Levine 




cultural factors on negative body image” increased the effectiveness of health education 
programs aimed at preventing the development of eating disorders (p. 3). Similarly, 
depersonalized patients with highly independent self-concepts could be made aware of the 
pervasive imagery found in magazines and other forms of consumer culture that encourage 
highly independent self-concepts,  predisposing them to depersonalization. 
Finally, the domain of technology has come to play a central role in organising our 
social lives. The rise of Facebook and virtual online communities now play a role in 
constructing our social self-representation, both in the online and offline worlds. Yee, 
Bailenson and Ducheneaut (2009) have revealed what they call the proteus effect: the 
phenomena where a player’s success in an online virtual environment will correspond to the 
apparent attractiveness and height of their avatar. In the most recent study of the proteus effect, 
the authors also demonstrated that one’s virtual self-concept affected one’s real-world self-
concept. It was found that players given taller virtual avatars acted more aggressively not only 
in the virtual environment, but also in subsequent face-to-face interaction with the other 
participants (Yee, Bailenson & Ducheneaut, 2009).  
One of the unique aspects of virtual online environments is the ability to consciously 
select one’s entire self-presentation. In games like Second Life, players can choose to take on 
any race, age, gender, or personality. To a lesser extent this is also true of more text-based 
online environments like blogs and message boards, where individuals can select a name and 
carefully control their self-presentation. If there was greater awareness that these created 
identities also influence one’s real-world self-concepts, individuals might choose to generate 
avatars or online personas that will have a healthy (or at the very least, desirable) influence 




real-world self-representations may be a way of combating unwanted self-concepts, or 
fostering new ones. Effectively, our online identities are a window into greater self-concept 
voluntarism. 
 Indeed, each of these four recommendations are aimed at presenting practical ways of 
obtaining greater self-concept voluntarism. However, while these community, environmental, 
media, and technology based suggestions offer four directions for developing more 
interdependent self-concepts, they are not exclusive, nor are they universal. Given that one is 
likely working against the predominant self-concepts in their cultural, a strategy that involves 
multiple recommendations is going to be most effective, in addition to treatments at the 
molecular, neurological and psychological levels. As mentioned, potentially every aspect of 
culture interacts with one’s self-concept, meaning that there are a multitude of possible options. 
These four suggestions were selected in response to the contemporary cultural environment, 
which will surely evolve, requiring new and creative approaches.  
Finally, our exploration in these four areas has further demonstrated the highly 
interconnected relationship between self-concepts and different cultural domains. In chapter 
five I shall consider the implications of the previous four chapters for our understanding of the 




Chapter 5: The Boundaries and Unity of the Self  
Section 5.1: Self-Concepts, Multilevelism, and the Unity of the Self 
This assessment of depersonalization has helped reveal the complex relationship between the 
self and its environment. What originally appeared to be a disorder uniquely characterized by 
its phenomenal nature became, under examination, a complex socially interwoven illness. Our 
review of this social dimension has suggested that independent self-concepts are responsible 
for higher rates of the illness in the West. This has raised implications both for the maximally 
effective treatment of depersonalization, and for our understanding of the self. In the former 
case, the trouble of identifying and addressing the broad cultural level of mental illness has 
been reviewed, and possible treatment options have been suggested. With respect to the self, 
our discussion has suggested that a highly independent conception is not only culturally 
unique, but also arguably descriptively erroneous, in light of the picture of the self presented by 
the MIM approach. I now wish to review this sprawling portrayal of the self and provide some 
clarifications as to the actual ‘inaccuracy’ of the independent and individualistic conception of 
the self. Specifically, I wish to discuss the problematic boundaries of the self, and the tension 
between the sense in which our internal self-concepts are arbitrarily (or pragmatically) bound, 
and the sense in which they can nevertheless be descriptively incorrect.  
The Gurduloo Problem and Pragmatic Boundaries of the Self 
Can anything be said definitively as to the boundaries of the self? Bas van Fraassen 
refers to this difficulty as the ‘Gurduloo Problem,’ which he playfully discusses in a strange 




Fraassen recalls a literary piece by Italo Calvino entitled The Non-Existent Knight, which tells 
the story of two conceptually antithetical characters. The first is Agilulf, a knight who, upon 
being asked to disclose his identity following heroic action in battle, opens his helmet to reveal 
only emptiness. The implication is that Agilulf is nowhere to be found in the world. 
Conversely, Agilulf’s squire Gurduloo does not know where to draw the boundaries of the self, 
and as a result he continually (and inappropriately) identifies with objects like rivers and trees 
(p. 459).  
Calvino’s parable helps to make salient the difficulty of demarcating the boundaries of 
the self; van Fraassen himself tries and rejects several attempts at a suitable definition, 
exploring population conceptions such as ‘that which is inside the skull’ or ‘everything that is 
inside the skin.’ However, he finds that they all have the same sort of ad hoc character and 
problematic or counter-intuitive consequences (p. 461-462), a result of trying to account for the 
shifting intuitions as to the boundary of the self. At one moment while deep in thought over a 
difficult problem in philosophy, my working self-concept may resemble only that perspectival 
aspect of myself that acts as the inner witness of all that is around me. In another moment, 
perhaps while volunteering at a needle-exchange, my skin may make an intuitive boundary of 
the self. In a third moment, say a reflective evening on my 70
th
 birthday, my entire life and 
everything that it has permeated, including my family and ancestors, may be the most natural 
self-concept.  
There is an aspect of circumstantial pragmatism in determining how expansive a self-
concept to employ, but it is not a totally smooth or singular continuum either, and appears to be 
carvable in many different ways. David Chalmers offers one option for bounding the mind in 




This is the “appeal to the dual boundaries of perception and action” between the mind and the 
world (Chalmers, 2008, p. xi). Perception acts as the interface through which the world affects 
the mind, while action acts as the interface through which the mind affects the world. One can 
then claim that on one side of these boundaries you will find the mind, and on the other, the 
world. However, Chalmers immediately complicates his own suggestion by noting that there is 
also inner perception (for example, in experiencing a mental image), and inner action (for 
example, in the creation of a mental note). While this may complicate the search for definitive 
system boundaries of the mind, the scaling nature of action and perception actually describe the 
pragmatic variations in self-concepts quite effectively.  
Note that the previously described expanding self-concepts are nested, with each larger 
self-concept including the previous. Using the boundaries of perception and action, the 
expanding self-concepts can therefore be represented as the following: 
 




Arrows travelling left to right represent actions, while arrows travelling right to left represent 
perceptions. The inner ‘I’ refers to the perspectival orientation of phenomenal consciousness. 
Ideas has been used as a shorthand for mental representations. The body and the world are 
relatively self-explanatory.  
We can review the three examples just mentioned on this nested model. In the first 
case, one’s self-concept is restricted to the realms of the inner ‘I’ and mental representations. 
Unless one believes that there could be content-free conscious states, they will necessarily 
include both of these realms, as mental representations are required for conscious 
representation. In this model, the most basic forms of self-consciousness consist of the ‘inner I’ 
having mental representations about the ‘inner I’. When Kircher and David spoke of 
introspective self-consciousness, they even described it as a ‘perception like’ phenomena. In 
the second case of the needle exchange volunteer, one’s self-concept encompasses the first two 
domains, as well as the domain of the physical body. The body perceives the world through its 
various senses, and acts on it accordingly. Lastly, in the third scenario, one’s self-concept 
expands out into the world, or at least the relevant interrelated aspects of the world, making the 
other scopes subsets of the larger self.   
It should be noted that figure 2 helps convey just one set from which we can draw self-
concepts, in this case, under the lens of action and perception as directional interfaces. This 
figure does not encompass all dimensions of variation in the self-concept; indeed, both 
independent and interdependent conceptions of the self could contract and expand on this 
scale, and nevertheless differ in other qualities. However, interdependent modes of being will 
likely encourage self-concepts that are more expansive, as larger conceptions incorporate more 




did share roughly the same boundaries for the self, they would likely differ on the degree of 
perceived permeability between the self and the external environment. Additionally, there are 
times when a highly neural or biological self-concept may be most relevant, which do not map 
onto this particular set of expanding self-concepts, as they are emphasizing a different level of 
description. We therefore draw working self-concepts from many levels and corners of the 
more complete picture of the self described by Thagard and Wood’s MIM model.  
The Unity of the Self and the Absence of a ‘Single Monolithic Self-Concept’ 
Nevertheless, these examples demonstrate that our working self-concepts often appear 
to be incommensurable due to the dynamic requirements of the environment. As Raymond 
Gibbs points out, this is in part because there is no “single, monolithic self-concept” (Gibbs, 
2006, p. 20). For Gibbs and others (ex. Dennett, 1992) the lack of a monolithic self-concept is 
sufficient evidence to claim that the self is a fictional collage of concepts, at best focused 
around a ‘centre of gravity.’ However, the assertion that the self is a kind of fiction does not 
necessarily follow from the lack of a monolithic self-concept, as this only pertains to the 
internal representations of the self. Self-concepts are not the self; they are pragmatic portrayals 
of aspects of the self, drawn from the larger account revealed by the MIM approach.  However, 
this raises fundamental questions as to the actual ontological status of the self. Is the self 
exclusively representational, that is to say, entirely ‘inside the head’? Or does it make sense to 
speak of the self as an externally existing entity like a blood vessel, and if so, might this ‘real’ 
self be in some sense ‘monolithic’?  
The MIM account suggests one answer; by providing a comprehensive picture, it 




such an expansive model as a working self-concept, as the entire self outlined by the MIM 
approach is hard to hold together in one conceptual grasp; it is a vast, adaptive concept, 
expanding out into the environment at four levels. In this sense, the MIM account provides a 
kind of external account of the self, one that is ‘monolithic’ in its completeness. As Thagard 
and Wood explain, their “goal is to display the unity of the self, not just its amazing diversity. 
Unification arises first from seeing the interconnections of the four levels described earlier, and 
second from recognizing how the interconnected mechanisms produce” the various functions 
of the self (forthcoming, p. 23). Of course, this is a unification of the model; it is not a 
unification of our working self-concepts. Yet even internally, the lack of a "single monolithic 
self concept" does not eliminate all aspects of unity with respect to the self. While our 
particular self-concepts appear to be incompatible, our experience is still phenomenally 
unified, due to its inherent perspectivalness, and the unifying effect of the foundational 
ambiance. The variations in self-concepts do not undermine these phenomenal forms of unity. 
We can therefore lack a monolithic self-concept for everyday working purposes, while 
simultaneously experiencing the self as whole phenomenally, and understanding the self as 
whole philosophically, by taking a multilevel approach.  Furthermore, it is from the external 
perspective that the highly interwoven and relational nature of the self becomes most apparent. 
This brings us to the second clarification; in what sense can self-concepts be incorrect? 
Section 5.2: The Incompleteness of Highly Independent Self-Concepts 
I have suggested a few times that independent self-concepts are not only contributing to 
depersonalization, but also descriptively erroneous or incomplete. However, if self-concepts 




different purposes, and not ‘wrong’ in any important sense?  I can see two ways in which a 
self-concept can be erroneous; firstly, by being pragmatically deficient, and secondly, by being 
a poor representation of actual dependencies with respect to the self. The first consideration is 
largely an empirical matter, and therefore cannot be answered here. But we can imagine that a 
comprehensive mental health review that monitored cultures across the collectivism-
individualism spectrum may reveal that some degrees of individualism or collectivism 
demonstrate unusually high mental health problems, suggesting that this range of associated 
self-concepts function least well for mental health.  
However, we can look to the representational accuracy and completeness of different 
self-concepts. Our discussion of depersonalization has revealed the extent to which self-
concepts are dependent on a huge number of environmental factors. Furthermore, the MIM 
account has provided a kind of comprehensive picture of the self, which we can appeal to in 
order to assess the completeness or accuracy of a particular self-concept. As discussed, the 
independent mode of being encourages self-concepts with constricted boundaries and minimal 
permeability between the self and the world. This conception is quite clearly at odds with the 
account given by MIM, which involves interactions with the broader environment at each 
level. Additionally, independence isn’t just a particular self-concept, but rather a ‘mode of 
being.’ As such, it is more foundational than any particular working self-concept, and likely 
influences the entire spectrum of specific self-concepts that one is likely to employ. This level 
of influence could therefore contribute to a variety of sub-optimally adjusted self-concepts, 
each neglecting the extent to which the self and world are involved in a dynamic relationship.  
 Conversely, a more interdependent mode of being will encourage greater permeability 




interdependence of the self and the environment. As Thagard and Wood have demonstrated, at 
each level of description of the self, we have an environment, parts, interactions and changes, 
which each level interwoven with the others. The collective portrait is that of a sprawling and 
permeable entity. A disposition to working self-concepts that routinely emphasize self-
sufficiency and independence of other domains poorly maps the actual relations revealed by 
the MIM account. It is therefore by using the MIM account as a kind of external portrayal of 
the self, that we can evaluate the accuracy and completeness of particular conceptions of the 
self. And from this evaluative perspective, highly independent conceptions of the self are 
overall poor representations.  
The Dynamic Self and Cultural Hegemony 
What does this evaluation of independent and individualistic conceptions of the self 
mean more broadly? With respect to the field of psychiatry, the obvious imperative is to make 
sure psychiatry recognizes that it may be employing a culturally specific (and potentially 
deficient) self-concept. Just as cognitive science has increasingly acknowledged the dynamic 
and situated nature of cognition in many of its contemporary research projects, psychiatry 
needs to be mindful of the environmentally ‘situated’ nature of the self-concept, and the risk of 
universally applying a culturally specific conception. Given the rise of depression and anxiety 
disorders in Western cultures, both of which overlap with depersonalization, it is quite likely 
that independent self-concepts share a role in mental health problems beyond the specific 
example of depersonalization. This possibility, if not likelihood, only increases the urgency to 




Collectively, this paper forms a twofold warning as to the dangers of uncritically 
accepting an excessively separated self, as doing so is both descriptively flawed and 
bioethically compromising. Thankfully, the issue of uncritically using Western subjects to 
draw broad psychological assertions has recently been put under the spotlight. A 
comprehensive assessment of this concern was recently made by psychologists Joseph 
Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan (2010). They developed the acronym WEIRD to 
outline the average characteristics of the unusual Western subject: white, educated, industrial, 
rich and democratic. In addition to directly biasing a great number of psychological findings, 
each of these characteristics will influence the kinds of self-concepts individuals employ. There 
is therefore good reason to suspect that in addition to the distinction between independence and 
interdependence, there are many other forms of cultural variation in the self-concept. The 
reasons to advocate for greater recognition of these biases therefore extend beyond simply 
attempting to integrate recent cognitive and psychological research into psychiatry; 
terminological provincialism and unchecked cultural specificity may unintentionally impose a 
singular vision of normalcy and health. By revealing the need to both address the cultural 
dimension of mental illness and recognize the cultural formation of the self, this assessment of 
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